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Conspicuous Philanthropy: Reconciling Contract and Tax Laws 
Abstract 
It sold for $15 million, and the IRS treated it as worthless. Avery Fisher, a titan of industry and a lover of 
classical music, made a generous contribution to renovate a charity's building, and in exchange the 
charity agreed to name the building after Fisher in perpetuity. Forty years later, the Fisher family sold the 
naming rights back to the charity for $15 million in cash. The IRS treats these publicity rights as worthless 
when charities grant them, and this generates substantial tax benefits for the donor and the donor's 
family. In contrast, the common law can treat these publicity rights as valuable consideration supporting 
an enforceable contract, and a charity may be liable for damages if it renames a building. Why the 
contradiction? What are the consequences? Should we reconcile these positions? How? This Article 
asserts that the common law contract approach is well-suited for today's mega-million dollar charitable 
building naming rights deals, but the tax approach is outdated and inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents. 




RECONCILING CONTRACT AND TAX LAWS
WILLIAM A. DRENNAN*
It sold for $15 million, and the IRS treated it as worthless. Avery Fisher, a
titan of industry and a lover of classical music, made a generous contribution
to renovate a charity's building, and in exchange the charity agreed to name the
building after Fisher in perpetuity. Forty years later, the Fisher family sold the
naming rights back to the charity for $15 million in cash. The IRS treats these
publicity rights as worthless when charities grant them, and this generates
substantial tax benefits for the donor and the donor's family. In contrast, the
common law can treat these publicity rights as valuable consideration
supporting an enforceable contract, and a charity may be liable for damages if
it renames a building. Why the contradiction? What are the consequences?
Should we reconcile these positions? How? This Article asserts that the common
law contract approach is well-suited for today's mega-million dollar charitable
building naming rights deals, but the tax approach is outdated and inconsistent
with U.S. Supreme Court precedents.
* Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Member, American Law
Institute. Partner and Associate, Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP (1985-2005).
Washington University School of Law, Adjunct Professor, Graduate Tax Program
(1996-2000). New York University School of Law, LL.M. (Executive) (2013);
Washington University School of Law, LL.M. in Intellectual Property (2003);
Washington University School of Law, LL.M. in Taxation (1997); St. Louis University
School of Law,J.D. (1985). Professor Drennan practiced law full-time for twenty years
in the areas of tax-exempt organizations, charitable giving, tax, estate planning, and
business law. Special thanks to Jennifer Davies, Class of 2018, for her excellent
editorial and research assistance.
1323
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................ 1324
I. Common Law Can Treat Charitable Publicity as
Consideration or a Gift ........................ 1332
A. Charitable Publicity as Consideration in Contract Cases
.... 1334
B. Gift Cases and Extreme Results ... ............... 1337
C. The Trouble with Gift Characterization and the
Relative Advantages of Contract Characterization for
Charities and Donors ................. ..... 1340
II. The IRS Treats Charitable Publicity as Worthless ........ 1343
A. The IRS Income Tax Approach Established Almost
Fifty Years Ago .................... ....... 1345
1. The IRS created its unitary rule when case law was
unsettled ........................ ..... 1350
2. U.S. Supreme Court subsequently established a
general test ...................... 1357
B. No Indication the Government Has Applied (or
Imposed) the Gift or Estate Tax on Charitable Publicity
Rights .................................... 1363
III. Problems with Inconsistericy and a Proposal................ 1370
A. Problems with Inconsistent Positions .... ...... 1370
B. Proposal for Reconciliation ....... .......... 1373
Conclusion ...................................... 1380
INTRODUCTION
When a donor contributes to a charity and, in exchange, the charity
names a prestigious building after the donor, the common law can
treat the arrangement as a part sale-and therefore a contract-but
the tax law will treat the transaction as an unrequited gift. This
contradiction can be very advantageous for charities and their donors
in the short run but may have long-term disadvantages for charities
and society generally.
The story of Avery Fisher and the Lincoln Center charity vividly
demonstrates the inconsistency and some of its consequences. Fisher
was a titan of industry, a lover of classical music, and a generous
1324 [Vol. 66:1323
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philanthropist! In 1973, Lincoln Center's philharmonic hall, home
of the New York symphony orchestra, needed renovation.2 Fisher
stepped forward and pledged $10.5 million for the renovation in
exchange for Lincoln Center's promise to publicize his name on the
building in perpetuity and to use the name "Avery Fisher Hall" on all
"tickets, brochures, program announcements, and advertisements and
the like" in perpetuity.3 Charities and their fundraisers now embrace
the sale of naming rights generally as an indispensable trick of the
trade for enticing donations.4
On the tax side, under a series of special rulings, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) treats a charitable donation in exchange for
public recognition as an unrequited gift with conspicuous
philanthropists like Avery Fisher deemed to receive nothing of value
in return for the contribution.' The IRS takes this position even
though the general rule is that no charitable deduction is available to
the extent a donor received a significant benefit for a contribution.'
This general rule recognizes that, to the extent the donor received a
benefit, the donor made a purchase, not a gift.' The related policy is
that the donor should only claim a charitable tax deduction when
1. See John Rockwell, He's First a Music Lover, Then a Philanthropist, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/10/archives/westchester-weekly-
hes-first-a-music-lover-then-a-philanthropist.html (describing Avery Fisher as "the
archetypal music lover," the "savior of the Lincoln Center concert hall that bears his
name," and a "high-fidelity pioneer"); Allan Kozinn, Avery Fisher, Philanthropist, Dies at
87, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/27/obituaries/
avery-fisher-philanthropist-dies-at-87.html?pagewanted=all (including within the list of
his accomplishments the founding of Fisher Radio, "an extremely profitable
[electronics] business").
2. See Kozinn, supra note 1 (specifying problems with the concert hall such as
"echoes in some parts ... and dry, unresonant sound elsewhere"); Robin Pogrebin,
Lincoln Center to Rename Avery Fisher Hall, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/arts/music/lincoln-center-to-rename-avery-
fisher-hall.html (reporting that Lincoln Center built the hall in 1962).
3. See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
4. See TERRY BURTON, NAMING RIGrs: LEGACY Gins AND CORPORATE MONEY 125
(2008) (outlining the "manager's toolbox for naming rights," a set of donor campaign
strategies for non-profit management).
5. See Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, 384 (defining the public recognition
donors receive for charitable contributions as an "incidental and tenuous benefit").
6. See generally Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105 (stating that there is a
presumption against interpreting a charitable contribution as a gift where the donor
receives a benefit).
7. Id. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f) (8) (A) (1996) (excluding "[g] oods or
services that have insubstantial value under the [IRS] guidelines").
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
there "is not a consumption by the donor."' Nevertheless, for almost
fifty years, the IRS has steadfastly clung to its special rule that charitable
recognition is not a benefit and is not consideration, and a donor like
Avery Fisher can treat the entire amount that he transferred to the
charity as a tax-deductible, unrequited gift.' Furthermore, for federal
estate tax purposes, there is no indication that a donor's estate (like
Avery Fisher's). must include the value of the perpetual naming right
in the taxable gross estate."o Because of this extremely donor-friendly
income and estate tax regime, if Avery Fisher, a wealthy business
magnate, was subject to a forty percent federal income tax rate in 1973,
and his estate was subject to a fifty percent federal estate tax rate upon
his death, the after-tax cost to the Fisher family of the $10.5 million
donation was only $3.15 million, or thirty cents on the dollar." U.S.
taxpayers shouldered the other seventy percent of the after-tax cost of
the donation." Commentators refer to the charitable contribution
8. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts"-the Income Tax
Definition and Treatment ofPrivate and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policyjustification
for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 441, 521 (2003) (noting that
the purpose of this distinction is to avoid double taxation on income the donor did
not consume).
9. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. If Avery Fisher had not made the donation, he could not have claimed the
$10.5 million income tax charitable deduction in 1973. At a forty percent marginal
federal income tax rate, without the charitable deduction, Fisher would have paid an
additional $4.2 million in federal income tax ($10.5 million x 40% = $4.2 million). If
Fisher had not made the donation, and still held the $6.3 million after-income-tax
balance at his death in 1994, and if his estate was subject to a fifty percent federal estate
tax rate, his estate would have paid an additional $3.15 million in federal estate tax.
Thus, Fisher's $10.5 million charitable donation saved $7.35 million in taxes ($4.2
million + $3.15 million = $7.35 million), so his after tax-cost of making the $10.5
million donation was only $3.15 million, or thirty percent of the amount donated
($3.15 million/$10.5 million = thirty percent). In effect, the Fisher family bore thirty
percent of the cost of the donation, and the U.S. taxpayers bore the other seventy
percent The author acknowledges that this calculation considers neither (i) the time
value of money, which would increase the percentage after-tax cost to the Fisher family
because of the gap between the year of donation and year of Avery Fisher's death, nor
(ii) the impact of Avery Fisher's state income tax savings which would decrease the
percentage after-tax cost to the Fisher family.
12. See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.




deduction as an "upside-down subsidy" because it benefits the rich
more than the poor.'3
On the common law side, Justice Cardozo's landmark Allegheny
College" opinion concludes that a charitable publicity arrangement can
be an enforceable bilateral contract because the charity provides a
benefit to the donor constituting consideration." Lincoln Center
honored its agreement o publicize Avery Fisher as the naming donor,
apparently without complaint, until another major renovation of the
music hall was necessary.'" In 2002, when Lincoln Center proposed a
new fundraising drive that would involve removing Avery Fisher's
name and allowing a new philanthropist to make a major donation and
acquire the primary publicity rights for the renovated building, Avery
Fisher's heirs threatened legal action to enforce the 1973 agreement.7
After twelve years of saber-rattling and negotiations involving up to ten
heirs, in 2014, the Lincoln Center charity repurchased the naming
13. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for theDeduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 657, 678 (2001) (observing that when a poor person makes a
contribution, there is no government subsidy because a tax deduction does not benefit
the poor donor who otherwise owes no income tax); Vada Waters Lindsey, The
Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L.
REV. 1056, 1058 (2003) (describing the charitable contributions rules as an "affront
[to the] progressive tax system" because low-income individuals do not benefit from
the rules); Todd Izzo, Comment, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable
Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2371, 2374 (1993) (noting that the charitable
deduction is most beneficial to taxpayers in the highest income tax bracket).
14. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
Allegheny College is a traditional favorite in contract law casebooks. See, e.g., RANDY E.
BARNETT & NATHAN B. OMEN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOcTRINE 714 (6th ed. 2017)
(reprinting an edited version of Allegheny College); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL.,
CONTRACTS 90 (6th ed. 2001); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 230 (8th ed. 2016) (referring to Allegheny College as a "leading
case");JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 315 (4th ed. 2001) (referring
to Allegheny College as a "famous opinion").
15. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 176.
16. See Pogrebin, supra note 2 (listing problematic acoustics and outdated
audience amenities among the faults). Avery Fisher passed away in 1994. Id.; Kozinn,
supra note 1.
17. SeeJohn K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming
Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 375, 450-52 (2005) (discussing
the merits of the Fisher family's specific performance demands); Pogrebin, supra
note 2 (explaining that in addition to the Avery Fisher Hall renovations that sparked
the legal threats, Lincoln Center proposed renovating its entire campus).
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rights from the Fisher heirs for $15 million cash plus lesser publicity
rights and honors for the Fisher family."
It is anomalous that the federal tax laws effectively treat these
publicity rights as worthless even though the Fisher heirs extracted $15
million cash from a sophisticated charity in exchange for those rights. 19
Another indication that charitable recognition can provide significant
benefits, and is bargained for, is the 2016 tale of Representative Greg
Gianforte, then a Montana candidate for Governor, who, in the midst
of his campaign, purchased the naming rights to the computer science
school at Montana State University for $8 million.20 State lawmakers
18. See Pogrebin, supra note 2 (detailing that in addition to the $15 million in cash,
Lincoln Center granted five additional honors or rights to the Fishers, including
automatic induction of Avery Fisher into the new Lincoln Center Hall of Fame,
prominent tributes to Avery Fisher in the lobby, and a guaranteed position for a Fisher
family member on the Hall of Fame's advisory board). In 2015, Lincoln Center
announced that it would change the building's name to Geffen Hall, in perpetuity, in
exchange for a $100 million pledge toward the renovation from the famous
entertainment mogul David Geffen. See Robin Pogrebin, David Geffen Captures Naming
Rights to Avery Fisher Hall with Donation, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/arts/david-geffen-captures-naming-rights-to-
avery-fisher-hall-with-donation.html? r=0; Robin Pogrebin, How David Geffen's $100
Million Lincoln Center Gift Came Together, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/arts/music/how-david-geffens-100-million-
lincoln-center-gift-came-together.html.
19. Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts (LCPA) owns and operates a complex
of performing arts buildings in the Lincoln Square neighborhood of Manhattan,
which hosts the New York Philharmonic, the Metropolitan Opera, and the New York
City Ballet. See generally Lincoln Center, http://www.lincolncenter.org/organization/
lincoln- center (last visited Aug. 30, 2017). "LCPA led a $1.2 billion campus
renovation, completed in October 2012." Id.
20. See Troy Carter, Lawmakers Propose Bill in Response to Gianforte's MSU Donation,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (May 17, 2016), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/
news/politics/lawmakers-propose-bill-in-response-to-gianforte-s-msu-donation/article
4993e3bd-09e8-529a-969a-fde4dl7a2599.html (reporting that Montana lawmakers
introduced a bill baring university system buildings from being named after elected
officials after Gianforte's donation). Greg Gianforte would ultimately win the
Republican gubernatorial primary, but lost the general election to Steve Bullock. See
Andy Boyd, Montanans Were Right to Take a Pass on Gianforte, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON
(Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/opinions/letters-toeditor/
montanans-were-right-to-take-a-pass-on-gianforte/article-c52755b7-f788-50b-8cf9-
4c86e47778e9.html (opining as to why Gianforte's election loss was a good thing for
Montana). A commentator argued that Gianforte made the donation to "exploit the
attention received in the media." JoLynn Yenne, Letter to the Editor, Gianforte's
"Money Problems," DAILY INTER LAKE (Apr. 30, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://www.dailyinterlake.com/article/20170430/ARTICLE/170439995.
Apparently, Gianforte is not the only political candidate to have publicized his
1328 [Vol. 66:1323
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subsequently introduced the anti-Gianforte bill prohibiting candidates
from using "gifts" to influence elections.21 Although the bill failed to
advance past the Montana education committee in 2017, the Board of
Regents for Montana State University adopted a policy generally
barring naming university places or programs for statewide or federal
political candidates. Also, very wealthy and generous philanthropist
Joan Weill pledged $20 million to Paul Smith's College of Arts and
Sciences in upstate New York provided the school would change its
name to "Joan Weill-Paul Smith's College."2 ' However, Joan Weill
reneged immediately when a court concluded the school could not
change its name.2 ' Despite the great value donors place on these
publicity rights, the IRS treats them as worthless.
philanthropy. See Bob Secter, Commentary: The Rich Can Name Their Price for Giving,
CHICAGO TRiuB. (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:14 PM),. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
donations-naming-rights-secter-20151026-column.html (describing Illinois Governor
Bruce Rauner's references to his philanthropy in campaign pitches, as well as the
pervasiveness of his philanthropy through naming rights on various community
buildings).
21. Dems Introduce Anti-Gianforte Bill Prohibiting Candidates fiom Using "Gifts" to
Influence Elections, MONT. DEMOCRATS, http://www.montanademocrats.org/news/
dems-introduce-ant-gianforte-bill-prohibiting-candidates-from-using-gifts-to-influence-
elections (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
22. See Gail Schontzler, Regents Bar Naming Buildings for Political Candidates,
BozEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/
news/montana_stateuniversity/regents-bar-naming-buildings-for-political-candidates/
article_64727a6f-d9cc-50b7-9078-51c28cd5d68e.html (specifying that the Regents
policy change prohibits naming things after political candidates unless "someone dies,
an unrelated person requests the honor[,] or other circumstances"); Gail Schontzler,
What's in a Name? Controversy, Montana Universities Find, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar.
1, 2017), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/montana-state-university/
what-s-in-a-name-controversy-montana-universities-find/article_745643be-f0ef-5a4f-
9fa7-9bl9f269767a.html (reporting that the bill was killed based on Montana
constitutional concerns).
23. Eric Konigsberg & Ben Ryder Howe, The Name Game: An Inside Look at the
Politics of Donations, TowN & CouNTRY (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-and-power/a5341 /naming-
rights-philanthropy-anonymous-giving.
24. Id.; Jacob Bernstein, Sandy and Joan Weill and the $20 Million Gift that Went Awry,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/fashion/sandy-
and-joan-weill-.and-the-20-million-gift-that-went-awry.html; Norris Burkes, It's Not Really
Giving Until It's Selfless, STAR-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:54 PM),
http://www.stargazette.com/story/news/local/2015/12/17/s-not-really-giving-until-
s-selfless/77485988 ("It'll be a sad Christmas for Paul Smith's College in New York, as
it won't be receiving the $20 million pledged by Sanford and Joan Weill."); David H.
Lenok, The Perpetual Naming Rights Problem: Is All Charity Helpful?,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/
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In considering whether the consequences of this inconsistency are
good or bad, in the short run, a charity's contractual sale of naming
rights and other publicity appears to be a win-win scenario for the
donor and the charity. The donor and the donor's family receive
public praise for their wealth and generosity, which can bring them
more wealth, and the charity's officers and fundraising department
receive praise for achieving their targets and making a building (or its
renovation) possible." In the long-run, however, these arrangements
pose potential problems for the charities involved and society
generally. These problems stem from two sources. First, from
complications in negotiating and resolving disputes, particularly with
donors who expect perpetual publicity rights and resist morals
clauses." And second, from difficulties in raising funds for charitable
endeavors that do not offer building naming rights or other forms of
enduring publicity, such as stocking the shelves at a food pantry or
providing supplies at the homeless shelter.
This Article explores the causes for the tax and common law
contradiction, considers possible means of reconciliation, and asserts
that the current tax treatment is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court
precedents. Based on the case law and relevant policies in this area,
this Article asserts that when claiming a charitable contribution
deduction donors should have the burden of proving (i) the amount
they gave to charity in excess of the significant benefits received in
return and (ii) that they contributed the excess with the intent to make
a gift. Replacing the IRS approach with this U.S. Supreme Court
philanthropy/perpetual-naming-rights-problem (reporting that the college
petitioned the New York State Supreme Court to "free it from the restrictions of its
founder's will [because] it 'nearly fatally impedes the ability of [the college] to seek
large gifts from a single donor [,]"' but the court rejected the petition because the
school's financial situation was not severe enough to warrant deviation from the will).
25. A substantial donation often is the ticket to membership on boards and
committees dominated by persons of wealth and influence, and these memberships
facilitate profitable business opportunities. See FRANcIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY
GIvE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY 44 (1995) (identifying specified donation
amounts as prerequisites for donors to serve on boards and other institutional bodies);
Kahn & Kahn, supra note 8, at 515 (observing that "the enhanced personal status that
a donor achieves in the community ... could translate into an economic benefit").
26. See Adam Scott Goldberg, When Charitable Gift Agreements Go Bad: Why a Morals
Clause Should Be Contained in Every Charitable Gift Agreement, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2015, at 48,
50 (defining a morals clause as a check on donors in the naming rights process,




general approach could change the tenor of negotiations between
charities and donors regarding publicity, encourage donors and the
IRS to reasonably value these publicity rights, and perhaps inspire
donors to contribute anonymously. These changes, in turn, could
eliminate some of the adverse consequences associated with
transactions involving charitable naming rights.
Part I of this Article discusses common law treatment of these
charitable publicity arrangements as contracts or conditional gifts. A
key factor in tipping the scale is whether charitable publicity provides
a benefit to the donor. Contract characterization is more likely when
the charitable publicity is a significant benefit, and contract
characterization can help courts reach more reasonable results when
resolving disputes between charities and donors.7
Part II analyzes the IRS's insistence that charitable public
recognition is not a significant benefit to the donor and is worthless.
The IRS developed this special rule in the late 1960s and 1970s, and
this Article maintains that the general judicial approach to charitable
deduction transactions in which the donor received a return benefit
changed after the IRS created the special rule. This Part also considers
an aspect of these transactions that appears to have never been
analyzed before, namely, their treatment under federal gift and estate
tax laws. The absence of precedent suggests that these benefits are
effectively valued at zero, generating no gift or estate tax liability for
the naming family. The favorable income, gift, and estate tax
treatment may artificially promote these arrangements.
Part III explains how these deals may adversely affect charities and,
more generally, society and considers some alternative approaches.
Under the common law, courts sometimes characterize significant
naming arrangements as conditional gifts. It is more appropriate,
however, to treat these arrangements as contracts under fundamental
common law tenets. Furthermore, in this context, contract law
remedies can be more flexible and generally superior to remedies
under the law of conditional gifts. In contrast, under tax law, the
current IRS approaches conflicts with key U.S. Supreme Court
opinions on charitable donors receiving benefits.
The conclusion suggests that the legal inconsistency reflects society's
divided view of conspicuous generosity. This Article proposes a
balanced approach, namely that these transactions are part sale and
part gift. This proposal can reduce disputes and lead to more
reasonable results.
27. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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I. COMMON LAW CAN TREAT CHARITABLE PUBLICITY AS
CONSIDERATION OR A GIFT .
The common law can treat charitable publicity transactions as
providing a benefit sufficient to qualify as consideration for an
enforceable contract, or it may treat these transactions as conditional
gifts. Standards that separate the contracts from the gifts are easy to
articulate but difficult to apply." When characterizing arrangements
as contracts, courts tend to say: "[o]rdinarily ... courts do not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration, particularly where one or both of
the values exchanged are difficult to measure;"' and a part sale and
part gift is treated as one transaction supported by consideration and
is an enforceable contract.so On the other hand, when characterizing
arrangements as conditional gifts, courts tend to say: (i) that a mere
pretense of consideration, such as a nominal amount, is not
consideration;" (ii) that "[n]othing is consideration that is not
regarded as such by both parties;`" and (iii) that the famous, enduring
hypothetical of the benevolent man and the homeless person applies."
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (AM. IAw INST. 1981)
("[T]he distinction between bargain and gift may be a fine one, depending on the
motives manifested by the parties."); seeAllegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank,
159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (discussing the difficulty applying the distinction in
practice); Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
("[T]here is no easy test for distinguishing between a condition and
consideration... ."); Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595,
601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (same).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c; JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 154 (6th ed. 2009).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c ("Even where both parties
know that a transaction is in part a bargain and in part a gift, the element of bargain
may nevertheless furnish consideration for the entire transaction."); PERILLO, supra
note 29, at 159 (providing an example in which a party promises to sell a used car
worth $5,000 to a friend for the friend's promise to pay $1,000; the arrangement is an
enforceable contract although the primary inducement is friendship).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (" [A] mere pretense of
bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of consideration or where the
purported consideration is merely nominal.").
32. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y. 1919) (quoting Wis. & Mich. Ry. Co. v.
Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903)).
33. See, e.g., Pennsy Supply, Inc., 895 A.2d at 600-01 (quoting Weavertown Transp.
Leasing, Inc. v. Moran, 834 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)) (employing the
hypothetical). See generally 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 231-33
(1920). The hypothetical in Professor Williston's 1920 treatise used the word "tramp,"
instead of homeless person. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 110 (suggesting using
the words "homeless person" rather than "tramp," "hobo," or "vagrant").
1332 [Vol. 66:1323
CONSPICUOUS PHILANTHROPY
In this famous hypothetical from Professor Williston, the benevolent
man says to the homeless person, "If you go around the corner to the
clothing shop there, you may purchase an overcoat on my credit."3"
Professor Williston concludes that although the homeless person
incurred a legal detriment because he agreed to comply with the
condition that he walks around the corner to the clothiers to pick up
a free overcoat, there is an insufficient benefit to the benevolent man
to create an enforceable contract, and the arrangement is a
conditional gift.3 Thus, it is often difficult to distinguish a contract
from a conditional gift.
Many courts have stated that a key factor in distinguishing a contract
from a conditional gift is whether the promisor received a sufficient
benefit.' When a charitable publicity transaction provides only a
nominal benefit to the donor, it would not provide sufficient benefit
to support an enforceable contract. These transactions may involve
(i) inclusion of the donor's name in an alumni appreciation booklet
or annual report that includes hundreds, or in some cases thousands,
of donor names;37 (ii) mention of the donor in a newsletter or press
release; or (iii) donor name placement on something as trivial as a
brick on a sidewalk, or as part of a list on a "donor wall" along with
34. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 895 A.2d at 600-01 (quoting Weavertown Transp. Leasing,
Inc., 834 A.2d at 1172). See generally WILUISTON, supra note 33, at 231-32 (setting forth
the hypothetical). Many contract casebooks discuss the hypothetical. See e.g., KNAPP
ET AL., supra note 14, at 110 (referring to "Professor Williston's 'an overcoat for the
tramp' hypothetical"); FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 14, at 52; MURRAY, supra note 14,
at 265 n.249 (providing a "paraphrase of the famous Williston 'tramp' illustration");
ROBERT E. ScoTr &JODY S. KRAus, CoNTRAcT IAw AND THEoRY 133-34 (3d ed. 2002)
(including "Williston's Tramp" as a heading and quoting Professor Williston at
length).
35. See Pennsy Supply, Inc., 895 A.2d at 600-01 (quoting Weavertown Transp. Leasing
Inc., 834 A.2d at 1172); WILLISTON, supra note 33, at 231-32.
36. See, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y.
1927) (quoting WILUSTON, supra note 33, at 231-32) ("An aid, though not a conclusive
test ... is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the
promisor."); see also Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (stating that while it is difficult to distinguish between consideration and a
condition, it is helpful to determine if the promisor receives a benefit); Pennsy Supply,
Inc., 895 A.2d at 601 (same).
37. Nevertheless, a listing may be a significant benefit to a donor included in an
elite category, in the front of the report, reserved for donors contributing substantial
amounts.
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dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of other donors.' This Article is
concerned with significant transactions such as naming rights over
prestigious university edifices, medical buildings, or other charitable
structures. This Part first explores charitable publicity arrangements
that courts have treated as contracts. Then, it examines transactions
that courts characterized as conditional gifts. Finally, this Part
describes the advantages of characterizing a transaction as a contract
rather than as a gift.
A. Charitable Publicity as Consideration in Contract Cases
Justice Cardozo's famous 1927 opinion in Allegheny College concludes
that the donor received a benefit sufficient to support a bilateral
contract because the charity agreed to name a scholarship fund after
the donor and publicize the donor's name in administering the
scholarship program.39  Although Justice Cardozo did not rely
extensively on prior cases in deciding that charitable publicity could
be sufficient consideration to support an enforceable contract, there
were older cases supporting this view.' In 1882, in Wolford v. Powers,"
the Indiana Supreme Court discussed English precedents concluding
that charitable publicity is valuable.
We find scattered through the books cases where devises of property
are made upon conditions having no pecuniary value at all, and yet
they are always enforced; and so we find men in life making
subscriptions to colleges on condition that they shall bear their
names, or endowing professorships upon condition that they shall
be given their names, and, so far as our observation has extended,
the validity of such conditions has never been challenged. It is
evident that the naming of a college professorship or the like has
always been considered as a matter of importance and value, for to
declare otherwise would be to affirm that courts and law-writers have
for ages been solemn respecters of worthless trifles. It will not do to
38. Cf Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (distinguishing
between substantial benefits to the promisor creating a contract and benefits "merely
incidental to the charitable nature of the transfer").
39. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 174-75 (finding an acceptance of terms because
"[t]he moment that the college accepted $1,000 as a payment on account, there was
an assumption of a duty to do whatever acts were customary or reasonably necessary to
maintain the memorial fairly and justly in the spirit of its creation").
40. Id. at 176 (citing only one New Jersey case and one Pennsylvania case for the
proposition that the charity incurs an obligation when promising to name).
41. 85 Id. 294 (1882) (involving a promise to pay $10,000 in connection with an
agreement o name a child after the payor).
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say that the bestowal of a name is a valueless act, and if once it be
granted to be of some value, then, in the absence of fraud and
oppression, it must be held to possess the value placed upon it by
the contracting parties.
Returning to the landmark opinion of Allegheny College, Justice
Cardozo carefully analyzed whether charitable publicity is a significant
benefit sufficient to support a contract. Allegheny College was
conducting a "drive" to raise $1.25 million for the school, and Mary
Yates Johnston made a pledge specifying that the "gift shall be known
as the Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund, the proceeds from which
shall be used to educate students preparing for the ministry, either in
the United States or in the Foreign Field."" The facts were unusual.
During the fund drive,Johnston promised that her estate would pay the
college $5,000 within thirty days of her death, but later Johnston gave
the college $1,000 toward the $5,000 pledge." Approximately seven
months later, Johnston repudiated the $4,000 balance of the pledge.
Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, concluded that Johnston
made an offer, and Allegheny College accepted." Justice Cardozo
found a bilateral (rather than a unilateral) agreement, stating that
when Johnston paid the $1,000, she "in effect [said]: I hand you
$1,000, and if you are unwilling to commemorate me, the time to speak
is now."" In regards to consideration, Justice Cardozo stated, "The
longing for posthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to
justify us in saying that its gratification is a negligible good."4 In
addition, Justice Cardozo found that "[tihe college set the [$1,000
contribution] aside to be held as a scholarship fund,"" and that the
college assumed the duty to "communicate to the world, or in any
event to applicants for the scholarship, . . . the name of the donor."5 0
More recently, in 2002, in .Stock v. Augsburg College,5 ' a college
promised to name a wing in its new building the "Elroy Stock
42. Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
43. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 173-74 (noting that the school was attempting to
raise an "additional endowment").
44. Id.
45. Id. (stating that Johnston "gave notice to the college that she repudiated the
promise," but the opinion fails to state any reasons forJohnston's repudiation).
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 176-77.
48. Id. at 176.
49. Id. at 174.
50. Id. at 175.
51. No. C1-01-1673, 2002 WL 555944 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002).
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Communication Wing" as a result of Elroy Stock's pledge of $500,000.52
Stock contributed the $500,000, but the college named the wing after
someone else." When Stock sued, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
characterized the arrangement as a contract, in part because Stock
intentionally increased his pledge from $100,000 to $500,000 when the
college representative promised the naming rights.5M Nevertheless, the
court did not grant Stock a remedy because he failed to sue within the
applicable six-year statute of limitations period.
Also, in 2009, in Paul & Irene Bogoni Foundation v. St. Bonaventure
University," the Bogonis pledged $2 million toward the new St.
Bonaventure University library addition to house the school's rare
books collection, and the school agreed to name the addition after
Paul and Irene Bogoni." The Bogonis paid $1.1 million, and the
university sued to collect the $900,000 balance.' The court concluded
that the naming rights arrangement was a unilateral contract, and the
college could sue to collect damages for the delay in payment.9
In addition, the view that charitable publicity can be consideration
also finds support in several baby naming cases.' For example, in
Schumm v. Berg," Gloria Schumm conceived a child with sixty-three-
year-old Academy Award winning actor Wallace Beery, and Schumm
agreed to include the name "Wallace" in the child's name in exchange
for cash payments in excess of Beery's legal obligations to support the
52. Id. at *1.
53. Id. at *4.
54. Id. at *1, *4.
55. Id. at *7.
56. No. 10,2095/08, 2009 WL 6318140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2009), ajfd, 913
N.Y.S.2d 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
57. Id. at *3-5.
58. Id. at *1, *6.
59. Id. at *12.
60. See, e.g., Daily v. Minnick, 91 N.W. 913, 914 (Iowa 1902) (discussing an oral
promise whereby the named child would receive forty acres of land); Wolford v.
Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 295 (1882) (recounting how if a child was named after Wolford,
he promised to "make its welfare his chief object in life"); Gardner v. Denison, 105
N.E. 359, 360 (Mass. 1914) ("The privilege of naming a child is a valid consideration
for a promise to pay money."). But see Dohrmann v. Swaney, 14 N.E.3d 605, 613-15
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (finding that an agreement o name children was unenforceable
under the particular facts because the agreement was either illusory, grossly
inadequate, or entirely fraudulent).
61. 231 P.2d 39 (Cal. 1951).
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child.2 Because Beery did not acknowledge paternity, he had no rights
in naming the child, and the court concluded that Gloria Schumm's
agreement to include "Wallace" in the child's name was adequate
consideration." While Beery refused to abide by most of the contract,
he made the agreed-upon payments during his life, but he died just
fourteen months after the child's birth.' Beery's estate refused to
honor the agreement, arguing that the right to name was insufficient
consideration to support the agreement.5  In concluding that the
naming right was valid consideration, and the estate was obligated to
make the payments, the court stated, "[H]aving a child bearits father's
name is commonly considered a privilege and honor, and Beery
assumed it was, for he obtained such a promise running to him."'
B. Gift Cases and Extreme Results
In some situations, courts have decided that charitable naming
arrangements were gifts rather than contracts under common law. As
discussed earlier, in general, it can be difficult for courts to draw the
line between gifts and contracts, and a key factor is the extent of the
benefit to the promisor." Two cases in particular demonstrate
potential problems for donors and charities when courts treat
substantial charitable recognition transactions as gifts.
In Tennessee Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v.
Vanderbilt University," the Tennessee Division of the United Daughters
of the Confederacy (Daughters of the Confederacy) contributed
$50,000 toward the construction of a dormitory costing $150,000 in
1933. In connection with the contribution, Vanderbilt's predecessor
agreed that female descendants of Confederate soldiers could stay
62. Id. at 41-42 (listing Beery's obligations to pay $100 per week from the day of
the child's birth until he reaches the age of twenty-one, and a lump sum of $25,000
when the child attains age twenty-one). The mother agreed to name the child
"Wallace" if the child was a boy and "Wally" if the child was a girl. Id.
63. Id. at 44 (noting that "[t]he privilege of naming a child is valid consideration"
because Gloria Schumm's promise was a detriment to her and a benefit to Beery); see
Carlton F.W. Larson, Naming Baby: The Constitutional Dimensions of Parental Naming
Rights, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 159, 166 (2011) (discussing various tate laws regarding
the rights of mothers and fathers in naming their nonmarital children).
64. Schumm, 231 P.2d at 43.
65. Id. at 44.
66. Id. at 44-45.
67. See supra notes 28-30, 36 and accompanying text.
68. 174 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
69. Id. at 104.
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rent-free in the dormitory's first two floors and agreed to "place on the
building an inscription naming it 'Confederate Memorial [Hall].'T
Over fifty years later, in 1987 and 1988, Vanderbilt completed a $2.5
million renovation of Confederate Memorial Hall, and university
officials and the university's Student Government Association began
debating the propriety of retaining the word "Confederate" in the
building's name.71 Eventually, in 2002, the university announced that
it would remove the word "Confederate" and simply call the dorm
"Memorial Hall," changing the name on its maps, websites, and
correspondence.7 2
Before the university removed the word "Confederate" from the
dorm's pediment, the Daughters of the Confederacy sued for breach
of contract.73 The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, concluded
that the arrangement was a gift, not a contract.74 The court stated that
the documents memorializing the Daughters' pledge did not "establish
a typical commercial arrangement in which one party provides certain
goods or services in return for a sum to be paid by the other party."7
The court's refusal to find a contract can be criticized in many respects.
First, not all common law contracts are "typical commercial
arrangements." For example, perhaps the leading case on the
historical approach to consideration, Hamer v. Sidway," involved a
nephew promising his uncle to refrain from alcohol, smoking, cursing,
playing pool for money, and playing cards for money, until attaining
age twenty-one.77 Second, many of the cases discussed above conclude
70. Id. at 104-05. The Daughters of the Confederacy contributed to Peabody
College, a teachers' college that merged into Vanderbilt University on April 28, 1979.
Id. at 106.
71. Id. at 106. In 2002, a Student Government Association resolution "stated that
the name ... had been under debate for fourteen years because of its negative
association with slavery." Id. at 108.
The resolution noted that names on buildings are usually a sign of pride and
thankfulness for the contributions made to construct them, but that
Vanderbilt was not proud of the legacy of slavery attached to the name of




73. Id. at 109.
74. See id. at 120 (holding that the Daughters of the Confederacy gave Vanderbilt
a gift, and Vanderbilt accepted the gift with its associated conditions).
75. Id. at 112.
76. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
77. Id. at 257.
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that charitable publicity is sufficient consideration to support a
contract without describing the naming rights as a "good or service."78
Third, the naming arrangement in Vanderbilt did involve the Daughters
of the Confederacy paying a "sum" in exchange for certain publicity
services from the school."
After the Tennessee Court of Appeals decided that the Daughters of
the Confederacy had made a conditional gift and Vanderbilt was
threatening to violate the condition, the court considered the remedy.
The court concluded that if Vanderbilt removed the word
"Confederate" from the dorm's pediment, it would have to return the
$50,000 gift plus earnings on that amount based on the Consumer
Price Index since 1933, bringing the damages up to approximately
$700,000 in 2005.80 Vanderbilt finally removed the word
"Confederate" from the pediment in 2016, and, under the court's
mandated approach, Vanderbilt paid the Daughters of the
Confederacy approximately $1.2 million."
The court's remedy ignores many significant facts, including (i) the
Daughters of the Confederacy contributed only one-third of the
original cost of the building, but they obtained exclusive naming
control; (ii) the Daughters of the Confederacy contributed no real
estate in connection with the establishment of the dormitory;
(iii) Vanderbilt University paid the entire $2.5 million renovation costs
in 1987 and 1988 with no contribution from the Daughters of the
Confederacy, and (iv) the Daughters of the Confederacy enjoyed the
naming rights for approximately seventy years.
Courts v. Annie Penn Memorial Hospital, Inc." is another charitable
naming rights case demonstrating a problem with gift
78. See supra Section IA.
79. See Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 104
(discussing the payment by the Daughters of the Confederacy).
80. Id. at 119; see R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND IAWYERING 217-18
(3d ed. 2011) (stating that the $700,000 amount was the present value of the gift based
on the Consumer Price Index).
81. See Nick Anderson, Vanderbilt University Removes "Confederate"from Inscription at
Front of Dorm, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/08/15/vanderbilt-
university-removes-confederate-from-inscription-at-front-of-dorm (reporting the $1.2
million figure). *
82. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 109.
83. 431 S.E.2d 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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characterization. In Courts, the donor invested her lifesavings in
stocks." In anticipation of a corporate merger, the donor mailed the
stock certificates to the local hospital's president, intending to endow
a memorial fund at the hospital in honor of her grandfather.6
Unfortunately, the donor simply mailed the endorsed stock certificates
to the hospital president, and he accepted the certificates immediately
before the donor specified her wishes regarding a memorial in honor
of her grandfather.8 Although the donor asked for family recognition
soon thereafter, the hospital eventually decided it would keep the
donor's contribution without honoring the donor, her grandfather, or
her family in any way.' The court described the actions of the hospital
officials as callous.' Nevertheless, the court characterized the
transaction as a completed gift rather than a contract, and, as a result,
the court concluded there was no remedy available for the donor."o
C. The Trouble with Gift Characterization and the Relative Advantages of
Contract Characterization for Charities and Donors
Contract characterization can have several advantages for the donor
and charity as compared to treating similar arrangements as
conditional gifts. When courts use contract law doctrines and
approaches, they may have flexibility in crafting remedies, implying
omitted terms based on parties' intent and compelling specific
performance. Donors and charities, therefore, may have less risk and
may anticipate more reasonable results when courts treat these
arrangements as contracts. The cases discussed in this Section help
demonstrate the disadvantages of the gift characterization, mainly that
remedies tend to be all-or-nothing. The charity may be forced to
refund the total contribution if the donor makes a conditional gift and
the charity does not satisfy every condition. Although donors may
receive windfalls, they may just as well find themselves with no recourse
to sue a charity that has not complied with all gift conditions if a court
84. See id. at 868 (concluding that the donor made an unconditional gift to the
charity).
85. Id. at 864.
86. Id. at 864-65.
87. Id. at 865.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 867.
90. Id. at 867-68 ("'[A]fter-the-fact' conditions are not recognized by the law ...
[and] to allow conditions to attach later would put the donee in a position fraught
with uncertainty regarding his or her rights to the property received.").
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finds that the charity substantially complied with its obligations. Both
sides of this coin illustrate the uncertain, winner-takes-all reality that
donors and charities may face when courts characterize arrangements
as gifts rather than contracts.
The court in Tennessee Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy
indicated that with the law of gifts only an all-or-nothing approach to
remedies is available." If a donor makes a conditional gift and the
charity ever fails to satisfy the condition, the charity must refund the
gift to the donor, regardless of the publicity services received by the
donor and any other events that occur after the gift." In Tennessee
Division'of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, Vanderbilt University
and its predecessor paid $2.5 million toward the construction and
renovation of a dormitory and presumably donated the land; the
Daughters of the Confederacy contributed only $50,000 in 1933 and
enjoyed the building naming rights for approximately eighty years.
Nevertheless, Vanderbilt University had to pay $1.2 million to remove
the word "Confederate" from the dormitory's pediment in 2016."
This potential for a donor windfall may explain, in part, how the
Fisher family convinced Lincoln Center to pay them $15 million for
the naming rights to a building that a Fisher family member described
as an "old slipper" on a campus of newly renovated buildings. If a
court were to characterize Avery Fisher's original $10.5 million naming
rights deal as a gift under the common law rules, and the Lincoln
Center then violated a condition of the gift by removing Avery Fisher's
name, the Lincoln Center could have been obligated to pay the Fisher
family approximately $56 million in 2015.'
91. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
174 S.W.3d 98, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]here a donee fails or ceases to comply
with the conditions of a gift, the donor's remedy is limited to recovery of the gift."
(emphasis added)).
92. Id. at 114,119.
93. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the amount paid by
the Daughters of the Confederacy and the benefits they enjoyed).
94. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (reporting the amount of money
Vanderbilt paid).
95. Pogrebin, supra note 2 (reporting that Avery Fisher's daughter, Nancy Fisher,
stated, "The hall was like an old slipper .... How could you avoid sensing that?").
96. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics online calculator, $10.5 million in
1973 would have had a purchasing power of approximately $56.05 million in 2015.
CPT Inflation Calculator, U.S. BuREAu LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2017); see also
Amy Schiller, Renaming Avery Fisher Hall Raises the Question of Authenticity, CHRON. OF
2017] 1341
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The donor family can reap a tremendous windfall under the law of
gifts even if it enjoys the naming rights for decades before the charity
removes the family name; however, the donors also risk receiving
absolutely nothing under the all-or-nothing approach of the law of
gifts. In St. Mary's Medical Center, Inc. v. McCarthy,17 the donor
contributed $250,000 for the benefit of the hospital post-mortem, and
the hospital used the funds to construct a chapel in 1956." In keeping
with the terms, the hospital installed a plaque stating that the chapel
was a memorial to the donor, Cornelia Haney." Nearly fifty years later,
in 2004, the hospital began demolishing the chapel to allow the
hospital to expand, and the family sued."'o In dicta, the court stated
that even if the publicity was a condition to the gift, the family could
not recover the gift plus earnings because the hospital had substantially
complied with its obligation to provide publicity for the donor.'01 The
introduction of the standard of substantial compliance in a charitable
publicity deal allows a court more flexibility to decide which side
should win. Nevertheless, donors and charities still face great uncertainty
when a dispute arises because the outcome will be winner-takes-all.
If the courts treated the Tennessee Division of the United Daughters of the
Confederacy and Fisher-Lincoln Center disputes as contracts, rather
than gifts, it is not difficult to see how much more flexibility the courts
would have had in determining damages and remedies. Generally, an
injured party in a breach of contract situation is entitled to the benefit
of the bargain."0 2 Presumably, in determining the extent to which the
donor has received the benefit of the bargain, a court would reduce
the donor's recovery for the value of the publicity already enjoyed.
Perhaps most important, the damages for breach of contract must be
reasonably foreseeable.0 s Alternatively, a court would have discretion
to grant specific performance, which would allow for an all-or-nothing
PHILANTHROPY (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Renaming-
Avery-Fisher-Hall/152193 (stating that Avery Fisher's $10.5 million donation in 1973
would be worth "more than $56-million in today's dollars").
97. 829 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
98. Id. at 1071.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1077 (qualifying its analysis in stating, "even if there was a ... valid
condition subsequent, St. Mary's use of the chapel for nearly fifty years represents
substantial compliance with any such .. . condition").
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 347 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1981).
103. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (1854) (setting forth the basic
rule used to determine damages for breach of contract).
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approach to the remedy similar to the approach under a gift analysis."o
For example, in Stock v. Augsburg College, in dicta, the court stated that
the donor could have recovered the entire amount of his donation
because the charity never provided the donor with any of the agreed-
upon publicity benefits."o'
The gift approach rather than the contract approach may restrict
the remedies available to the parties and tie the courts' hands, leading
to unjust results. Courts v. Annie Penn Hospital, Inc. demonstrates
another potential problem with the law of gifts.o' In Courts, because
the hospital president accepted the property delivered before the
donor told the hospital president about her desire to create a
memorial for her grandfather, the court apparently had no choice in
deciding the case under the law of gifts.1o7 Although the court
described the hospital president's dealings with the donor as callous,
the court concluded it could not grant any relief whatsoever to the
donor.os In contrast, with a contract law approach, a court would have
flexibility in deciding whether the terms of the deal were really
finalized when the hospital president accepted delivery of the gifted
property.'" Also, under a contract approach, the court might imply
omitted terms based on the intentions of the parties.1 o
II. THE IRS TREATS CHARITABLE PUBLICITY AS WORTHLESS
For almost fifty years, the IRS effectively has treated charitable
recognition as providing no benefit to donors. This allows a
conspicuous philanthropist to claim a charitable income tax deduction
in the same manner as an anonymous donor. In the midst of a raging
controversy, the IRS created these rules before the U.S. Supreme
Court provided a general framework for analysis.
In 1917, Congress authorized an income tax charitable deduction,
but Congress provided little guidance to taxpayers, the IRS, and the
courts for situations when a donor transferred money or property to a
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 357 ("[S]pecific performance of a
contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has
committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the duty.").
105. No. C1-01-1673, 2002 WL 555944, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002).
106. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Courts case).
107. See Courts v. Annie Penn Mem'1 Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (asserting that "after-the-fact conditions are not recognized by the law").
108. Id.
109. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAwINST. 1981).
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charity and received some benefit in return."' The statute allows an
income tax deduction for a "charitable contribution, "112 and a
charitable contribution means a "contribution or gift" to a qualified
organization."' Neither the statute nor the regulations define the
term "gift." The relevant legislative history is so "sparse" that the U.S.
Supreme Court has relied upon the 1954 legislative history of a related
statute in emphasizing that gifts are payments "made with no
expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of
the gift."n' Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not quote these reports
in its cases on this topic, the legislative history also states that "payments
are not 'gifts' if paid 'in consideration of a binding obligation ....
[Payments are gifts] only if there [is] no expectation of a quid pro quo."115
In the absence of legislative guidance, before 1980, courts made
compelling arguments for different approaches in a variety of factual
situations.116 Congress's laconic approach fails to indicate whether the
donor's intent is relevant when deciding if a transfer is a gift and
whether decision makers should determine intent objectively or
subjectively. If intent was relevant, taxpayers, IRS officials, and the
courts may have needed to weigh all the facts and circumstances and
made different factual determinations. Fact finders may have felt
111. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). The original
Internal Revenue Code did not include an income tax charitable deduction for gifts
to charity; Congress added the deduction when it increased income tax rates to finance
World War I. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989) (citing 2 B. BrrrKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND Girrs 1 35.1.1 (1981)) (tracing history of
the charitable deduction); Mark L. Geier, Note, What the Good Lord Giveth, Uncle Sam
Taketh Away: A Proposal Allowing Payments Made in Exchange for Religious Benefits to Be
Tax Deductible, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct.
16 (1986), 13 HAMUNE L. REV. 433, 444 (1990) (discussing the War Revenue Act of
1917's charitable contribution deduction).
112. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1) (2012).
113. § 170(c).
114. Geier, supra note 111, at 445 (quoting S. Rep. No. 83-1622 (1954)); see
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690 (describing the legislative history as "sparse" and relying on
the 1954 legislative history instead); Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d
1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985), (noting that "[t]he only real clue as to what Congress
intended by the term charitable contribution is a comment regarding [I.R.C.] section
162(b)" enacted in 1954), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986). Section 162(b) of the 1954
legislation "provides that contributions which exceed the [percentage] limitations of
section 170 are not deductible as trade or business expenses." Am. Bar Endowment, 761
F.2d at 1578 n.7.
115. Geier, supranote 111, at 445 (quoting S. Rep. No. 83-1622 (1954)) (alteration
in original).
116. See infra notes 165-70 (discussing cases providing such arguments).
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adrift "on an illimitable ocean" of information in trying to calculate
the correct amount of tax due. Not surprisingly, before the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed this fundamental issue, taxpayers, the IRS,
and the courts, in a variety of factual situations, seized upon objective
factors and tried to establish easy-to-apply, absolute rules to decide
cases without the necessity of making "painstaking inquir[ies]" into
complex factual situations.ns Automatic rules can create certainty and
permit quick and easy decision-making, but they also can lead to
injustice and create opportunities for manipulation, abuse, and
unintended consequences.
A. The IRS Income Tax Approach Established Almost Fifty Years Ago
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the IRS established its approach for
charitable publicity transactions. At that time, the controversy about
the relevance of donor intent in the charitable deduction area was
reaching its zenith in the courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court had not
yet established a general test. In .1968, the fountainhead ruling,
Revenue Ruling 68-432,11' involved a transaction far removed from
today's mega-million dollar building naming deals, but the ruling
established the IRS position that conspicuous philanthropists can
deduct their entire contributions regardless of the value of the
charitable publicity received in exchange.12 0
Revenue Ruling 68-432 considered the deductibility of membership
dues paid to a charity operating a museum and library for the study of
the fine arts.121 The organization basically had two groups of members.
Both groups enjoyed the same privileges associated with membership,
but one group paid lower membership dues. The first group, the
Annual and Family members, paid only $2x and $3x respectively which
117. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 297 (1960) (Frankfurterj, concurring).
118. Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 416 (1984) (establishing
that a portion of payments for group insurance from an organization is considered a
charitable contribution if a member shows that an equivalent insurance product was
available to him for a lower price and that he bypassed that product because he wished
to make a charitable contribution to the organization), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 761
F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
119. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
120. See, e.g., Harvey P. Dale & Roger Collinvaux, The Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAx LAw. 331, 340 (2015) (citing Rev. Rul. 68-432 and
later IRS pronouncements, and concluding, "For these purposes, the value of...
recognition, praise, and even naming opportunities are disregarded").
121. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104.
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was the minimum allowed by the charity to become a member.122 The
other groups, the Sustaining and Fellowship members, paid $5x and
$20x, respectively.123  Only one of the privileges of membership
involved any publicity rights. The non-publicity membership privileges
included free or discounted admission to "poetry evenings" and other
events and discounts on the purchase of certain publications.'2 ' The
only privilege of membership apparently providing any publicity was
"invitations to selected lectures and other special events for members
only."' 2 5 This only provided publicity among the members themselves.
This publicity likely provided minuscule prestige benefits and limited
business-connection benefits when compared to the corresponding
benefits associated with naming a building at a prestigious university
or major medical complex.
In Revenue Ruling 68-432, the IRS described the membership dues
paid as "contributions" and stated that whether a member could claim
a charitable contribution deduction was a question of fact.22 The IRS
indicated it would decide this question of fact based on a series of
considerations that made no mention of the donor's intent.127 The
first consideration was the objectives and activities of the organization;
the IRS may have included this factor so that it could consider whether
the charity solicited the contribution as part of a charitable bizarre or
other fund drive. 12  The second consideration was the "nature ... of




125. Id. The ruling did not expressly state that this privilege provided publicity, but
presumably attendance at these events would signal to other members that one had
paid the annual membership dues.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 104 (setting forth the income tax
charitable deduction rules for donors who contributed as part of "charity balls, bazaars,
banquets, shows, and athletic events," or other fundraising activities and received some
type of return benefit).
129. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104. Perhaps the IRS intended this to refer
solely to the "satisfaction of participating in furthering the charitable cause," which
the IRS disregards in Rev. Rul. 68-432. Id. at 105. Also, the IRS may have intended to
include other types of benefits, such as the privilege of "being associated with or being
known as a benefactor of the organization" which the IRS describes in Rev. Rul. 68-
432 as not being a "significant return benefit[] that [has] a monetary value." Id.
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consideration was the "extent of the benefits. . . conferred upon its
members."o3 0
After listing these considerations, the IRS stated that it would assign
any particular membership arrangement to one of three classes, and
this classification would help determine the amount of the member's
charitable contribution deduction.
In the first class, the IRS stated that if the value of the return
privileges were reasonably commensurate with the member's payment,
the donor had not made a tax deductible charitable contribution.s13
The IRS assigned the Annual and Family membership dues payments
to the museum and library into this class because there was a
"reasonable relationship to the monetary value of the corresponding
benefits that thereby [became] available to [these] individual[s]."
The IRS emphasized that it would treat a privilege as a return benefit
if it was available to the members regardless of whether the individual
exercised, or even wanted, the privilege.
In the second class, the IRS stated if the return benefits were merely
"incidental to making the organization function according to its
charitable purposes and the only return benefit thereby obtainable is the
satisfaction of participating in the furthering of the charitable cause,"
then the payment of the membership dues was a tax-deductible gift.'13
The third class applied when the dues payment "substantially
exceed[ed] the value of any benefits or privileges offered [and] the
discrepancy between the size of the membership contribution and the
potential monetary benefit is so great as to make it reasonably clear
that the payment is of a dual character."'5 In this third class, the IRS
stated that the portion of the donor's contribution compensated for
with benefits will not be deductible, but any excess payment will be a
tax deductible charitable contribution.'" The IRS assigned the
Sustaining and Fellowship membership dues payments to this third
category and presumably allowed a charitable deduction for the
130. Id. at 104.
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id.; see alsoRev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104,105 (adopting the same position).
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amounts these members paid in excess of the amounts charged the
Annual and Family members.13 1
In connection with setting forth the list of considerations and the
different ways it would classify membership payments, the IRS tossed
out the following statement: "Such privileges as being ... known as a
benefactor of the organization are not significant return benefits that
have a monetary value within the meaning of this Revenue Ruling.""
This gratuitous sentence appears to have formed the basis of the IRS's
income tax treatment of charitable publicity rights generally even
though the phrase "within the meaning of this Revenue Ruling" could
be read to limit this conclusion to the particular facts involved in
Revenue Ruling 68-432.'
In 1969, Congress enacted the self-dealing rules for private
foundations, which impose different penalties than reducing a donor's
income tax charitable deduction.1"' The self-dealing rules specify
when a substantial contributor to a private foundation (or another
insider) and the foundation's managers should be subject to excise
taxes when the private foundation engages in a transaction with a
substantial contributor or another insider."' The self-dealing rules
provide that if the substantial contributor or other insider received
merely an "incidental or tenuous benefit" as a result of the transaction,
the excise tax does not apply.142 The regulations interpreting the self-
dealing statute, which the IRS originally promulgated in 1973, state,
"[T]he public recognition a person may receive, arising from the
charitable activities of a private foundation to which such person is a
substantial contributor, does not in itself result in an act of self-dealing




140. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
141. See I.R.C. § 4941(a) (2012) (imposing an excise tax of ten percent of the
amount involved on the substantial contributor or other insider and imposing a five
percent excise tax on each foundation manager who knowingly participates in the
transaction); § 4941(b) (increasing the excise tax to 200 percent if the transaction is
not reversed within a specified period after the IRS provides notice); see also
§ 4942(c) (2) (capping the maximum excise tax on a foundation manager at $40,000
for one act of self-dealing).
142. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (d)-2 (f) (2) (2017) (stating there is no "act of self-dealing"
if the benefit is merely incidental or tenuous).
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since generally the benefit is incidental and tenuous."1 4 3  The
regulations include the following example about naming rights:
A, a disqualified person with respect to private foundation S,
contributes certain real estate to S for the purpose of building a
neighborhood recreation center in a particular underprivileged
area. As a condition of the gift, S agrees to name the recreation
center after A. Since the benefit to A is only incidental and tenuous,
the naming of the recreation center, by itself, will not be an act of
self-dealing.'4
The example does not explain why the benefit is merely incidental
and tenuous. In any event, with this regulation, the IRS has indicated
that public recognitions, such as building naming rights, are merely
incidental and tenuous benefits, and it therefore disregards them
when calculating excise taxes.
In a 1973 Revenue Ruling, the IRS considered if there was an act of
self-dealing when an individual made a substantial donation to a
private foundation and the private foundation, in turn, donated
money to a public charity on the condition that the public charity
change its name to include the name of the substantial contributor.145
In the ruling, the public charity changed its name and agreed that it
would not change its name again for at least one hundred years, and a
court had "determined that the charity had the power to bind itself not
to change its name for one hundred years."" The IRS concluded the
"public recognition a person may receive, arising from the charitable
activities of a private foundation to which such person is a substantial
contributor, does not in itself result in an act of self-dealing since
generally the benefit is incidental and tenuous. "147 Although they do
not involve the charitable income tax deduction, these authorities
under the self-dealing rules all indicate the IRS had no desire in
dealing with the difficult factual issues involved with determining
whether a naming donor intended to make a gift, whether the charity
provided publicity as a quid pro quo for the contribution, or the
contribution had a dual purpose.
In 1977, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 77-367 and concluded that
a public charity will not jeopardize its charitable tax status if it grants
143. Id. (emphasis added); 38 Fed. Reg. 9493, 9498 (Apr. 17, 1973).
144. § 53.4941 (d)-2(f) (9) ex.4.
145. Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, 383.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 384.
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publicity rights to a corporation in exchange for donations.' In
Revenue Ruling 77-367, the charity operated a replica of an early
nineteenth century American village."' A corporation donated the
land and provided a "substantial percentage of the organization's
support."150  In exchange, the charity named the village after the
corporation, and the charity acknowledged the corporation's support
in its pamphlets and historical research publications.1 ' The IRS
concluded that the publicity benefits were "merely incidental to the
benefits flowing to the general public," so the organization operated
exclusively for charitable and educational purposes.15 1
These rulings and regulations, all promulgated at least forty years
ago, have provided the authority for charities and their donors to treat
charitable publicity rights as effectively worthless.' 5  Scholars and
practitioners cite these authorities when advising donors and charities
to treat charitable publicity rights as worthless for income tax purposes.'"'
1. The IRS created its unitary rule when case law was unsettled
The IRS adopted these authorities, which effectively ignore
charitable publicity, in the midst of a raging controversy over the
necessity and procedures for determining the charitable donor's
intent when the donor received a return benefit. The word "gift" had
created a similar controversy for general tax purposes under Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) section 102 a few decades earlier, and the
arguments in that debate were echoing in the charitable contribution
deduction cases in the 1960s and 1970s.155
148. Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193, 194.
149. Id. at 193.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 194.
153. See I.R.S. Ann. 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51, modified by Ann. 92-58, 1992-15 I.R.B.
54 (confirming approach).
154. See Dale & Collinvaux, supra note 120, at 340; JOSEPH P. TOCE, JR. ET AL., TAx
EcoNoMIcs oF CHARYTABLE GIVING 197 (2006) (discussing donor recognition and
concluding "the contribution deduction amount should be unaffected"); John V.
Woodhull & Vreni R.Jones, The Who's Who and What's What of Charitable Fundraisers, 13
J. TAX'N ExEMPT ORG. 23 (2001) ("[T]he naming of a building after a donor is
considered an incidental benefit for purposes of the self-dealing rules. It is arguable
that these types of incidental benefits should also be treated as incidental benefits for
purposes of determining the extent to which the donor is entitled to [an I.R.C.]
Section 170 deduction.").
155. See e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 418-19 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
(discussing generally the definition of "gift" that the parties want the Court to adopt).
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IRC section 102(a) provides that "gifts" are not subject to income
tax, but Congress provided no definition of the word "gift."156 Several
courts grappled with defining "gift" under IRC § 102(a) and
formulated conflicting tests to determine if a payment was a gift.157
When the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the IRS strenuously
argued for clarification in the form of automatic rules, presumably so
the IRS could avoid analyzing donor intent.'5 Specifically, in litigating
Commissioner v. Duberstein,'5 1 the IRS requested that the U.S. Supreme
Court adopt a series of presumptions subject to various exceptions and
corollaries." The IRS's proposed general test would have defined gifts
as "transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from
business reasons,"' and automatic, mechanical rules flowing from the
IRS's proposed general test would include: (i) a payment by an
employer to an employee cannot be a gift;"' (ii) a recipient cannot
treat cash or property as a "gift" if the payer treated the transfer as a
deductible business expense;63 and (iii) a business corporation cannot
make a gift.'" These rules would have easily resolved the disputes in
156. See I.RC. § 102(a) (2012) ("Gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift. . . ."); Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960)
("Specific and illuminating legislative history on the point does not appear to exist.").
157. See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284 (discussing confusion in the circuit courts
regarding the definition of gift under § 102(a)).
158. Id. at 283.
159. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
160. Id. at 287.
161. Id. at 284 n.6. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter praised the IRS's view that
personal transactions are more likely to be tax-free gifts than business transactions.
[Wie should normally suppose that a payment from father to son was a gift,
unless the contrary is shown, [but] in the two situations before us the business
implications are so forceful that I would apply a presumptive rule placing the
burden upon the beneficiary to prove the payment wholly unrelated to his
services to the enterprise.
Id. at 296 (Frankfurter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 287 (arguing that employer payments would not be a gift). But see I.R.C.
§ 102(c) (1) (2012); 54 Fed. Reg. 631 (proposedJan. 9, 1989) (to be codified at Treas.
Reg. § 1.102-1 (f) (2)) (providing that the IRS recognizes a transfer from employer to
employee as a gift "if the purpose of the transfer can be substantially attributed to the
familial relationship of the parties and not to the circumstances of their
employment").
163. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 287.
164. Id.
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the consolidated cases before the Court without the need for any
significant fact-finding.65
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the IRS's calls for clarification in
the form of mechanical rules because the statute did not list or suggest
such automatic rules. The Court said, " [T] he problem is one which,
under the present statutory framework, does not lend itself to any
more definitive statement that would produce a talisman for the
solution of concrete cases."" In struggling with the statutory
language, the Court quotes an oldJustice Cardozo tax opinion stating,
"One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready
touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is
rather away of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle.""'
The Court declined to adopt the common law test for a gift, and the
Court concluded that the word "gift" under IRC § 102 should be
defined in a "more colloquial sense"'" based on the "fact [finder's]
experience with the mainsprings of human conduct."' Applying this
view, the Court concluded that a "gift" is a transfer which "proceeds
from a 'detached and disinterested generosity' . . . [a] nd in this regard,
the most critical consideration . .. is the transferor's 'intention.'"70
After concluding that the transferor's intent is the most critical
consideration, the Court considered whether a fact-finder's search for
a transferor's intent would be an objective or subjective quest, and
decided this is an "objective inquiry" and that the transferor's
165. In the Duberstein case, Duberstein was the president of a metal company, and
he provided valuable referrals to another metal company which profited from the
referrals. Id. at 280. He accepted a Cadillac automobile at the insistence of the
president of the other metal company for the referrals. Id. at 280-81. If the Court
had adopted the IRS's mechanical rules, the Court could have automatically
concluded that Duberstein did not receive a tax-free gift because the other metal
company "deducted the value of the Cadillac as a business expense on its corporate
income tax return." Id. at 281. In the companion case, Stanton v. United States, a
corporation made a severance payment to Stanton upon the termination of his
employment with the corporation. Id. at 281-82. Presuming the IRS's proposed rule
that employers cannot make tax-free gifts to employees would extend to payments to
former employees for past services, the IRS's proposed rule would have easily resolved
the Stanton case.
166. Id. at 284-85.
167. Id. at 288 n.9 (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).
168. Id. at 285.
169. Id. at 289.
170. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added) (quoting Comm'r v. LeBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956); Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937)).
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characterization or expectation has "nothing to do with the matter."1
Additionally, "the proper criterion, established by decision ... is one
that inquires what the basic reason for [the transferor's] conduct was
in fact."172 The Court acknowledged that the general test and specific
rules proposed by the IRS may highlight important facts in deciding
cases.'7 3 However, it rejected the use of any single factor as a
"shibboleth"17 ' and emphasized that the fact-finder in any particular
case (either a judge or a jury) must consider all the facts and decide
the case "based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding
tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct o the
totality of the facts of each case."17 ' This approach "may not satisfy an
academic desire for tidiness, symmetry[,] and precision in this area ...
[b]ut the question here remains basically one of fact, for
determination on a case-by-case basis."'76
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter asserted that when enacted, the "tax
conception of a gift no doubt reflected [a] non-legal, non-technical
notion of a benefaction unentangled with any aspect of worldly
requital.""7 Accordingly, Justice Frankfurter agreed with the majority
that the common law test for a gift should not apply, and there were
inherent difficulties in formulating a "general rule or test sufficiently
definite to confine within narrow limits the area of judgment."117
Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for not
providing greater explicitness that a business relation "militate [s]
against a gift."17' Regarding the majority's directions that the fact-
finder determine intent by relying on their "experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct,"so Justice Frankfurter stated that the
majority "sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable ocean of
individual beliefs and experiences" which will "encourage [] too
individualized diversities in the administration of the income tax law."181
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 287.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 288-89.
176. Id. at 290.
177. Id. at 295 (Frankfurter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 289.
181. Id. at 297.
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After Duberstein, the charitable "gift" test was unsettled. In the two
decades following the decision, taxpayers, the IRS, and the lower
courts debated whether the Duberstein principles were relevant in
defining the word "gift" under IRC § 170 when a donor made a
contribution to charity and received a return benefit. Some courts
embraced Duberstein, and others rejected it.
The Court of Claims debated the topic at length in Singer Co. v.
United States.'"' The Singer Sewing Machine Company sold sewing
machines at a forty-five percent discount to public and parochial
schools, the Red Cross, government agencies, and government and
nonprofit hospitals, and it sold sewing machines at a twenty-five
percent discount to churches and all other charities.' Singer claimed
a charitable contribution deduction for the discounts.' The IRS
urged the Court of Claims to apply Duberstein and conclude that Singer
did not transfer the sewing machines to the schools with detached and
disinterested generosity because the company anticipated future
economic benefits."' Specifically, if public or parochial students
learned to sew on Singer machines in school, those students would be
more likely to buy Singer machines later in life.' On the other hand,
Singer argued that Duberstein was inapplicable to charitable
contributions under IRC § 170 and that the school discounts should
be "gifts" under IRC § 170 because Singer did not receive a "specific
and direct quid pro quo flowing from the transfer."'"7
The Court of Claims rejected both the IRS's reliance on Duberstein'8
and Singer's proposed test distinguishing between direct and indirect
benefits.'"' Emphasizing the language of the legislative history, the
Court of Claims stated that "charitable gifts are 'those contributions
which are made with no expectation of a financial return
commensurate with the amount of the gift.""9" It continued, "[W]e
do not contend that absolutely no benefits can be derived from an
182. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
183. Id. at 415.
184. Id. at 416.
185. Id. at 418.
186. Id. at 423.
187. Id. at 419.
188. Id. at 422.
189. Id. at 420 ("We are of the opinion that [Singer's] analysis ... is overly restrictive
and quite narrow.").




otherwise charitable contribution or gift. It is only when the benefits
derived are substantial enough to provide a quid pro quo for the
transfer that the deduction is not allowed.""' This test arguably tracks
the familiar "bargain" requirement under the common law of
contracts, in which a benefit, bargain, or quid pro quo exists if the
promisor would refuse to proceed with the transaction in the absence
of the return benefit."' Relying on three factors, the Court of Claims
concluded that Singer's "predominant reason for granting [the]
discounts [to the schools] was other than charitable" because Singer
"expected a return in the nature of future increased sales."1 9 3 It is
noteworthy that although the Court of Claims rejected the Duberstein
analysis proposed by the IRS, the Court of Claims based its conclusion
on Singer's expected and predominant reason for contributing.194
One of the first charitable contribution cases expressly applying the
Duberstein principles was the Tax Court's opinion in Dejong v.
Commissioner.' In Dejong, the taxpayers' two children attended a
church-operated grammar school."' Church officials told the
taxpayers that the cost of educating their two children for the year
would be $400, and the church officials suggested that the taxpayers
contribute the full amount of that estimated cost.' 7 The taxpayers
contributed $1075 and claimed the entire amount as a charitable
contribution deduction."' The Tax Court cited Duberstein and stated,
"If a payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated
benefit to the payor beyond the satisfaction which flows from the
performance of a generous act, it is not a gift."" The Tax Court
agreed with the IRS's determination that $400 of the transfer was a
payment for services and not a deductible charitable contribution.'
A later case following Defong and Duberstein was Collman v.
Commissioner,o' in which the taxpayer owned a citrus grove bounded
191. Id. at 423 (citations omitted).
192. See PE1ULLO, supra note 29, at 159-60.
193. Singer, 449 F.2d at 423-24.
194. Id.
195. DeJong v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 896 (1961), affd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
196. Id. at 900.
197. Id. at 899-900.
198. Id. at 900.
199. Id. at 899 (citing Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278).
200. See id. at 900 (concluding that the $400 payment was "induced, at least in
substantial part, by the benefits which the parents sought and anticipated from the
enrollment of their children as students in the [Church's] school").
201. 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975).
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by Orangethrope Avenue and bisected by Orchard Avenue.0 The
taxpayer dedicated approximately three-quarters of an acre of land
(worth more than $33,000) to the local municipality, and the local
municipality agreed to expand the two streets and construct gutters
and curbs.20s After citing Dejong with approval, the Ninth Circuit cited
Duberstein for the rule that "[t]he critical consideration... is the
transferor's intention ... [and the] decision as to intent or motive
necessarily must be based on the factfinder's experience with human
conduct as applied to the totality of the facts."2" The Ninth Circuit
rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that the taxpayer was entitled to
no charitable deduction; instead the Ninth Circuit merely reduced the
deduction by the $20,711 cost of the improvements which "represents
consideration" to the taxpayer.205
Some courts questioned whether the focus on the transferor's intent
was appropriate. In 1972, the First Circuit "expressed [its]
dissatisfaction with such subjective tests as the taxpayer's motives in
making a purported charitable contribution."2 " Employing more
memorable language in a prior case, the First Circuit stated, "Were the
deductibility of a contribution under section 170(c) ... to depend on
'detached and disinterested generosity,' an important area of tax law
would become a ... nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value
judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality."2 17 In contrast, in Dowell
v. United States,20s the. Tenth Circuit emphasized that although
Duberstein focused on the transferor's intent, Duberstein also directed
the fact-finder to "predicate his conclusion upon his experience '. . .
with the mainsprings of human conduct as applied to the totality of
the facts of each case . ... '"'209 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
emphasized that the transferor's subjective and self-serving testimony,
while admissible, will only "be given such weight as the circumstances
from the entire record dictate."2 0 Because such testimony will likely
202. Id. at 1265.
203. Id. at 1265--66.
204. Id. at 1267.
205. Id. at 1269.
206. Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972).
207. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 146, 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
208. 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
209. Id. at 1238 (quoting Comm'r. v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, -289 (1960)
(alteration in original)).
210. Id. at 1238 (citing King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976)).
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be "subjective" and "inclined to be self-serving in relation to the issue
of intent" such testimony will be suspect.211
2. U.S. Supreme Court subsequently established a general test
In 1986, in United States v. American Bar Endowment,212 the U.S.
Supreme Court established a two-prong test to calculate the charitable
deduction when an individual transfers funds to a charity but receives
a benefit in return. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the
burden is on the donor to prove both prongs.213
In American Bar Endowment, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a
peculiar fact pattern but chose to establish a general test intended to
apply to all charitable donors who receive a substantial benefit in
return.' American Bar Endowment (ABE) was a charitable
organization described in IRC § 501 (c) (3) and was eligible to receive
tax-deductible charitable contributions. ABE initially developed a
group-term life insurance program216 and eventually expanded the
program to include health, accident, and disability insurance
policies.1 Under ABE's program, American Bar Association (ABA)
members paid premiums to buy insurance.21' The dividends on that
insurance, which the insurer normally would pay back to the insured-
member, were retained by the ABE for its charitable activities.' The
dividends were the ABA members' premiums in excess of ABE's cost
of providing the insurance.22' ABE explained the charitable aspects of
211. Id.
212. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
213. Id. at 117-18.
214. See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that "[t]he taxpayers' case is unusual"), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
215. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107 ("ABE's primary purposes are to advance
legal research and to promote the administration ofjustice . . . .").
216. Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 405-06 (1984), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
217. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107.
218. Id. ("The ABA is exempt from taxation as a 'business league' under [I.R.C.] §
501(c) (6)."). Business leagues are tax-exempt, but they are not entitled to receive tax-
deductible charitable contributions. Am. Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 413. Business
leagues often use affiliated organizations described in IRC section 501(c) (3) to carry
out charitable activities. See BRUcE R. HopKINs, THE IAw OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONs 874 (10th ed. 2011) (providing an example of a medical society
organizing a scholarship fund for medical students "as a charitable organization for
both tax exemption and tax-deductible charitable giving purposes").
219. Am. BarEndowment, 477 U.S. at 108.
220. Id.
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this arrangement o an ABA member before the member joined and
began paying premiums, and there was no requirement that an ABA
member buy this insurance.221 ABA members were free to buy
insurance from other sources.2 ABE informed participating
members "what percentage of [their] total premiums had been ...
used for charitable purposes," and many ABA members claimed an
income tax charitable deduction for the dividends retained by ABE, as
if the participants had paid those amounts to a charity.2 23
The IRS disallowed ABA members' charitable income tax
deductions for the dividends arguing that ABA members had not made
gifts or contributions and instead merely purchased insurance." The
divergent legal theories used, and the conclusions reached, by the
different courts deciding this case demonstrate the legal uncertainty
pervading this entire topic before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision.
At trial, the U.S. Claims Court stated that " [t] he valuation of insurance
is ... difficult,"2 2 ' but ruled that no member could deduct any part of
the dividends.22' The Claims Court appeared to adopt two theories.
First, the court stated no charitable deduction is available "where the
entire amount paid by the taxpayer is economically motivated.""
Second, the court stated that "[t]o establish that a portion of the
payment for ABE insurance is a charitable contribution, a [taxpayer]
must show that an equivalent insurance product was available to him
for a lower price and that he bypassed that product because he wished
to make a charitable contribution to the Endowment. "228
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Claims Court
applied the wrong legal test and reversed.2' The Federal Circuit relied
heavily on Singer and another case to conclude that an ABA member
could deduct the amount of the dividends by showing that his or her
transaction had a "charitable nature" rather than a "business
221. See Am. Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 408 (noting members were "well informed"
about the program and its "fundraising nature").
222. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Am. Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 409.
224. Id. at 415.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 417-18.
227. Id. at 415.
228. Id. at 416.
229. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d 1573,1581-83 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
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nature.""o The Federal Circuit criticized the Claims Court for making
an "incorrect definitization of the proper standard" and imposing "too
harsh a burden on [donors].""' In the final appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the Federal Circuit's legal test.
In American Bar Endowment, the U.S. Supreme Court devoted just
three pages to this topic. 3 ' The Court initially stated that
[w]here the size of the [donor's] payment is clearly out of
proportion to the benefit received, .'. . [a] taxpayer may therefore
claim a deduction for the difference between a payment to a
charitable organization and the market value of the benefit received
in return, on the theory that the payment has the "dual character"
of a purchase and a contribution.2 3 3
The Court then added an additional requirement, namely that "the
excess payment must be 'made with the intention of making a gift.' 2 "
The Court clearly holds that the burden is on the donor to prove both
prongs of the test.2 35
Applying the two-prong test to the four individual ABA members
involved in the case, the Court held that three members did not satisfy
their burden under the first prong. They "failed to establish that the
value of ABE's insurance to them was less than the premiums paid."2 3 6
230. Id. at 1582 (citing Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir.
1983)); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971)) (indicating that the
transaction would have a "charitable character" for members who made "a sworn
assertion that they wanted to aid that charitable endeavor and entered [ABE's] plan
because it enabled them to do so"). For a discussion of the Singer case, see supra notes
182-87 and accompanying text. In Ottawa Silica, the taxpayer contributed real estate
to a school district and expected the transaction to increase the value of other land
owned by the taxpayer. Ottawa Silica Co., 699 F.2d at 1126-27. The Federal Circuit
concluded the taxpayer was not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction
because the taxpayer expected a future economic benefit. Id. at 1132.
231. Am. Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1581. The Federal Circuit also criticized the
Claims Court for calculating the value of the insurance incorrectly. Id. at 1582 ("[T]he
court below failed to take into account the fact that .. . the participants are entitled to
their dividends.").
232. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1986). Separate
from the charitable deduction issue, the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in a detailed
analysis of whether ABE was liable for unrelated business income tax (UBIT) on the
net income earned from the insurance program. See id. at 109-16.
233. Id. at 117 (citing Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 118 ("The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he
purposely contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he
received in return.").
236. Id. at 117.
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Although the fourth member satisfied the first prong, he did not meet
his burden under the second prong because he "failed to establish that
he was aware of [a cheaper insurance] program during the years at
issue. "237 Thus, he failed to meet his burden that he "purposely
contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he
received in return," or phrased another way, he "failed to demonstrate
that he intentionally gave away more than he received."23 1
Further, in American Bar Endowment,. the U.S. Supreme Court
ignored its 1960 Duberstein decision, so the IRS need not follow the
Duberstein principles.239 Nevertheless, Duberstein contains some wisdom
in evaluating donor intent that the IRS could consider in formulating
a new approach to charitable publicity. Because the IRS established its
approach to charitable publicity before this U.S. Supreme Court case,
the IRS should reevaluate its position.
Three years after American Bar Endowment, the U.S. Supreme Court
tackled another case in which the donors received a hard-to-value
benefit. In Hernandez v. Commissioner" hundreds of members of the
Church of Scientology claimed a charitable contribution deduction for
payments to the Church in exchange for certain intangible religious
benefits, referred to as "auditing" and "training" services." The
Church designed the auditing and training services to allow church
members to become "aware of [their] spiritual dimension.""' In
disallowing the claimed deductions, the IRS asserted that the church
members received a return benefit, so their payments were purchases
and not gifts under IRC § 170.243
The U.S. Supreme Court discussed its prior decision in American Bar
Endowment with approval,2" but the Court did not need to discuss the
American Bar Endowment est in detail, nor expand on procedures for
237. Id. at 118.
238. Id.
239. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 8, at 512 (discussing the American Bar Endowment
and Hernandez cases and concluding, "[T]he Duberstein standard of 'detached and
disinterested generosity' . . . has been rejected or ignored by the Supreme Court").
240. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
241. Id. at. 683; see Geier, supra note 111, at 433 (discussing the donations to the
Church of Scientology).
242. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684.
243. See id. at 686.
244. See id. at 691 (discussing American BarEndowment and stating the Court "upheld
the Commissioner's disallowance of the partial deductions because the taxpayers had




its application, because the donors did not challenge this general
method of analysis.4 Instead, the donors specifically argued that any
"quid pro quo analysis is inappropriate under § 170 when the benefit
a taxpayer receives is purely religious in nature," and that any
"payments made for the right to participate in a religious service
should be automatically deductible under § 170."12' Also, the
dissentingjustices argued that intangible religious benefits are difficult
to value under any quid pro quo analysis because there is no non-
charitable, commercial market for this type of a return benefit.4 7
The Court rejected these arguments, stating that they find "no
support in the language of § 170,"2" and "[ t] he Code makes no special
preference for payments made in the expectation of gaining religious
benefits [and] ... the legislative history ... offer[s] no indication that
Congress's failure to enact such a preference was an oversight."2 19
Regarding calculating the value of the auditing and training services,
the Court rejected the argument that it was impractical to value the
services because "the Church itself had 'established and advertised
monetary prices' for auditing and training sessions."s2 o Applying these
principles to charitable publicity, many charities now advertise naming
245. See Rodney P. Mock, Burning down the House and the Charitable Deduction, 11
Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 353, 377 (2011) ("The Hernandez court made no mention of the
substantial versus incidental issue. Instead, it threw further darkness on the issue in a
footnote, stating that the taxpayers never argued that their payments qualified as 'dual
payments,' and that they are therefore entitled to a partial deduction.").
246. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 692. This argument finds support in the IRS's treatment
of pew rents, payments for attendance at High Holy Day services, and mass stipends.
See Tax Wrte-Offs for Synagogue Seats: Any Prayerfor Full Deductibility ?, 107J. TAX'N. 317,
317-18 (2007) (citing Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49, 49).
247. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 706-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It becomes
impossible, however, to compute the 'contribution' portion of a payment to a charity
where what is received in return is [an item] ... that is not bought and sold except in
donative contexts so that the only 'market' price against which it can be evaluated is a
market price that always includes donations."). The dissenting judges indicated that
between the choices of (i) allowing a deduction for payments in exchange for
intangible religious benefits and (ii) prohibiting any deduction whatsoever for a
payment in exchange for an intangible religious benefit, it would be preferable to
allow donors to deduct these payments in full. See id. at 707.
248. Id. at 692 (majority opinion).
249. Id. at 693.
250. Id. at 688 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 819 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1st Cir. 1987),
affd, 470 U.S. 680 (1989)); see also Kahn & Kahn, supra note 8, at 519-20. (agreeing
that, although a charitable organization may have greater bargaining power, it is
reasonable to accept the value of the benefit as equal to the price that the charity
charged for it).
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rights and the related minimum donation amounts on their websites,
in effect providing a price list to prospective donors.5
In addition to indicating that the IRS and the courts should apply
the first prong of the American BarEndowment test even when the return
benefits are hard to value, the Court in Hernandez indicated that when
applying the second prong-the donor's intent test-the IRS or a
court may sometimes resolve the inquiry by focusing on external
factors rather than making a complex analysis of other factors. 52
Hernandez was a rather unique factual case in that the donors received
intangible religious benefits, and the Church structured the program
with many commercial features, including publishing a price list,
offering pre-payment discounts, refusing to provide any free services,
and granting refunds if an individual paid but did not receive the
services purchased from the price list. 53
American BarEndowment, and to a lesser extent Hernandez, established
an analytical framework for determining a donor's charitable
contribution deduction when the donor received a return benefit.
Because the IRS created its approach to charitable publicity in
Revenue Ruling 68-432 and the other authorities before the U.S.
Supreme Court established the method of analysis in American Bar
Endowment and Hernandez, it would be appropriate for the IRS to
reconsider its approach. Furthermore, American Bar Endowment
emphasized that the donor should bear the burden in these cases.5
As the IRS approach in Revenue Ruling 68-432 and the related
authorities fail to clearly put the burden on the donor, arguably
Revenue Ruling 68-432 and the related authorities no longer create an
appropriate approach in these situations.
251. See Drew Lindsay, Your Name Here.Org, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 2015, at 20,
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/As-Menu-of-Naming-Rights/230469
(discussing how the age of the Internet has promoted a growing practice of non-profits
advertising naming opportunities).
252. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690-91 (noting that focusing on external factors
allows the IRS to avoid "imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual
taxpayers").
253. Id. at 691-92.
254. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1986).
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B. No Indication the Government Has Applied (or Imposed) the Gift or
Estate Tax on Charitable Publicity Rights
The federal estate tax and its sidekick, the federal gift tax, have faced
many existential crises."'6 The role of these taxes, which are imposed
on gratuitous transfers of property during life and at death, is
controversial. Commentators assert that this transfer tax system has
not raised significant revenue for the government, but it has great
potential to address wealth inequality.2" President Theodore
Roosevelt, a staunch advocate of death taxes, said, "[A] prime objective
should be to put a constantly increasing burden on the inheritance of
those swollen fortunes which it is certainly of no benefit to the country
to perpetuate."5 ' Despite Theodore Roosevelt's eloquence, Congress
did not pass a federal estate tax until the Woodrow Wilson
Administration.5
The estate tax imposes a high, flat rate of tax on the value of the
decedent's estate in excess of a threshold amount.' The threshold
255. See Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It
Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 762 n.14 (2007) (referring to the gift tax as a "necessary
backstop to the estate tax"). See generally Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the
Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REv. 223, 223 (1956) (observing that the ancient Egyptian, Greek,
and Roman civilizations imposed taxes at death; however, historical critics were
primarily concerned with causing stress to the survivors rather than economic
ideology); Rahim Silberstein, A History of the Death Tax: A Source of Revenue, or a Vehicle
for Wealth Redistribution , PROB. & PROP., May/June 2003, at 58, 62-63.
256. BoRIs 1. BYrTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GwFr TAXATION 1 (10th ed. 2011)
("[These] taxes... are not important sources of government revenue. The federal
government has collected $40 billion to $2 trillion in taxes annually since World War
II; of this amount, estate and gift taxes have yielded only $500 million to $30 billion a
year."); see, e.g., Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Addressing the Wealth Disparities: Reimagining
Wealth Taxation as a Tool for Building Wealth, 92 DENV. U. L. REv. 145, 146-47 (2014)
(discussing the potential to address wealth inequality).
257. BITKERETAL., supra note 256, at 3 (citing 17 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WORKS OF
THEODORE ROOSEvELT 434 (1925)); see Silberstein, supra note 255, at 61 ("Roosevelt
propelled the death tax movement into the limelight in 1906.").
258. Carlyn . McCaffrey & John C. McCaffrey, Our Wealth Transfer Tax System-a
View from the 100th Year, 41 ACTEC L.J. 1, 2 (2015) ("Our current wealth transfer tax
system was ... battle-born on September 8, 1916, a few months before the United
States joined World War I on April 6, 1917.").
259. See BrrrKERET AL., supra note 256, at 19 (noting that in 1976 Congress reduced
the unified gift and estate tax rate from 77 percent to 70 percent). For decedents
dying in 2017, the unified gift and estate tax rate was a flat 40 percent. I.R.C. § 2001(c)
(2012); see Stephen M. Margolin & Lindsey Paige Markus, Estate Tax Relief Income Tax
Headache: Estate Planning and the American Taxpayer ReliefAct, ILL. B.J., Feb. 2014, at 92,
96 (explaining the new challenges imposed by the estate tax and offering two
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amount has varied significantly over time.2' For decedents dying in
1975, the tax-free threshold was only $60,000;261 for decedents dying in
2017, the tax-free threshold was $5,490,000.262 As further evidence of
volatility, there was no federal estate tax for decedents dying in 2010.63
For example, when billionaire George Steinbrenner, former owner of
the New York Yankees baseball team, died that year, the federal
government could not collect any estate tax.26 4  In 2016, both
President-elect Donald Trump and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan
proposed abolishing the federal estate tax.265
suggestions depending on the client's needs: a fully funded marital deduction trust
and a traditional A/B trust to retain wealth). The lower tax rates listed in the
I.R.C. § 2001(c) rate schedule generally do not apply because of the estate tax
exemption amount under I.R.C. § 2010(c). See BIrKERET AL., supra note 256, at 20
(observing that because the unified credit under I.R.C. § 2010(c) effectively exempts
the amount of taxable transfers otherwise taxed at lower rates, the "estate and gift taxes
in effect are imposed at a flat . .. rate").
260. See BrrrKER ET AL., supra note 256, at 19 ("The exemption (i.e., the amount
sheltered from tax by the unified credit) has grown by leaps and bounds from its
original level of less than $200,000 under the 1976 Act.").
261. See id. (noting the $60,000 estate tax threshold); Silberstein, supra note 255, at
60-61 ("The 1976 Act also increased the $60,000 estate tax exemption to $175,000.").
262. Seel.R.C. § 2010(c) (3) (A) (setting the "basic exclusion amount" at $5 million);
I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(B) (directing that the basic exclusion amount will increase
annually for inflation in $10,000 increments for decedents dying after 2011); Rev.
Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707, § 3.35 (2016) (specifying that the exclusion amount
for 2017 is $5,490,000).
263. See Peter J. Kosydar, III, "Death and Taxes" or Death Without Taxes, 37 J.
LEGIs. 224, 225-26 (2012) (exploring the constitutionality and ramifications of a
retroactive estate tax).
264. Id. at 225. ("George Steinbrenner potentially saved his heirs $500 million by
dying onJuly 13, 2010 [because]... the estate tax was repealed for the year 2010.").
265. See Max Ehrenfreund, Analysis: By 2025, 99.6% of Paul Ryan's Tax Cuts Would
Go to the Richest 1 % of Americans, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/09/16/analysis-by-2025-99-
Sof-paul-ryans-tax-cuts-would-go-to-the-richest-1-of-americans/?utm-term=.84fe208b2d43
(regarding Speaker Paul Ryan's tax plan); Sahil Kapur, Estate Tax Repeal Would Be a
Bonanza for Trump and His Cabinet, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2016 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-09/estate-tax-repeal-under-
trump-would-benefit-president-cabinet (observing that President Trump and Speaker
Ryan's mutual desire to abolish the estate tax would offer Trump's cabinet a windfall
in tax-savings); Anthony G. Sandonato, Keeping Your Balance: What Estate Planners Might
Expect Under Trump, DAILY REc. (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://nydailyrecord.com/2017/01/19/keeping-your-balance-what-estate-planners-
might-expect-under-trump (discussing President Donald Trump's tax plan); see also
Brandon C. Roman, Tax-Writers Huddle Up as Trump Releases Tax Principles, CAP.
THINKING BLOG (May 1, 2017), http://www.capitalthinkingblog.com/2017/05/tax-
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The federal gift tax is an essential compliment to the federal estate
tax. The federal estate tax generally applies to property in which the
decedent has an interest at death.2" As a result, if there were only an
estate tax, the wealthy could transfer their property to younger
generation family members before death and avoid transfer tax.
Accordingly, the government created a gift tax to restrict tax-avoidance
opportunities.6 ' The gift tax allows a generous annual exclusion,2"
but the tax on amounts given during lifetime in excess of the annual
exclusion may be subject to a gift tax coordinated, at least in part, with
the estate tax. As an example of the coordination between the gift
and estate taxes, prior adjusted taxable gifts are added to a decedent's
taxable estate to calculate the "tentative estate tax," and that amount is
reduced by a unified credit, to approximate the total tax liability as if
the decedent had not made any lifetime taxable gifts and instead had
transferred all the property at death.270
The Avery Fisher saga271 colorfully illustrates that a philanthropist
can transfer substantial wealth to younger family members through a
charitable naming arrangement. In the Fisher saga, the family
patriarch, Avery Fisher, donated $10.5 million to a charity and received
perpetual naming rights over a very prominent charitable building in
New York City. After his death, when the charity concluded it needed
writers-huddle-up-as-trump-releases-tax-principles (reporting that the Trump
Administration released a list of tax principles on April 26, 2017 proposing the repeal
of the estate tax but preserving the charitable income tax deduction for individuals).
266. See I.R.C. § 2031 (a) (defining gross estate).
267. See § 2501(a)(1) (establishing a gift tax); McCaffrey & McCaffrey,. supra
note 258, at 13 (noting that "[t]he stated purpose of the gift tax was to prevent the
avoidance of the estate tax").
268. SeeI.R.C. §§ 2503(a)-(e) (permitting an annual exclusion of $10,000, adjusted
for inflation, as well as exemptions for donations to minors, education, and medical
expenses).
269. See Silberstein, supra note 255, at 60 ("[T]he Tax Reform Act of 1976...
integrated the formerly separate estate and gift tax schedules."). Before a donor would
pay a gift tax, the donor's taxable gifts during lifetime would need to exceed the estate
tax exclusion amount. See I.R.C. § 2505 (a) (1) (allowing a credit equal to the estate tax
credit under § 2010(c) applicable "if the donor died as of the end of the calendar
year"); see also supra note 262 and accompanying text (discussing the $5,490,000 estate
tax exclusion amount for decedents dying in 2017).
270. See Bn-rKER ET AL., supra note 256, at 21 (noting that the systems are not fully
integrated, in part, because a "decedent's taxable estate includes amounts used to pay
estate taxes, but a donor's taxable gifts do not include amounts used to pay gift taxes").
271. For a more detailed discussion of the Avery Fisher saga, see supra notes 1-4,
15-18 and accompanying text.
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to violate the condition and rename the building to raise funds to
renovate, Fisher's heirs sold those naming rights back to the charity for
$15 million. There appears to be no reported cases or other legal
authority indicating the IRS has even attempted to impose a gift or
estate tax on charitable publicity rights benefitting a decedent's
heirs.2  Nevertheless, the gift and estate tax structures could impose a
federal gift and estate tax in these situations.
In general, IRC section 2501 (a) (1) imposes a tax on the "transfer of
property by gift," and the amount of the gift is reduced by the value of
any consideration received." The applicable regulations clarify that
" [t]ransfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those [in] ...
accord with the common law concept of gifts," and includes any
exchanges when the value of the property contributed exceeds the
consideration received in return. In a charitable naming
transaction, the philanthropist will transfer money or property to the
charity in exchange for publicity. Thus, for gift tax purposes, a naming
philanthropist may have made a gift to the charity to the extent the
philanthropist's contribution exceeds the value of the return publicity
benefits received.27 ' Normally in calculating the gift tax, a donor can
deduct all gifts made to a charity.26
272. See McCaffrey & McCaffrey, supra note 258, at 41 n.175 (discussing the right of
publicity but failing to cite any cases regarding charitable naming rights). See generally
Mitchell Gans et al., Postmortem Rights of Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of
New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 203, 206 (2008),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/postmortem-rights-of-publicity-the-federal-
estate-tax-consequences-of-new-state-law-property-rights (concluding that
"[d]escendible property rights to postmortem publicity... are property rights that
likely will be included in a decedent's gross estate" but not mentioning charitable
publicity rights); Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled
Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAx REv. 759, 773 (1998) (noting that "every
expansion of the concept of property has resulted in an expanded application of the
estate tax" but not mentioning charitable publicity rights).
273. I.R.C. §§ 1250, 2512(b).
274. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992); see Comm'r. v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306
(1945) (concluding that the gift tax can apply even when the donor has no "donative
intent" under state law).
275. For gift tax purposes, the amount of a present interest gift also would be
reduced by the amount of the annual exclusion, which was $14,000 in 2017. See I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) (1) (providing for a $10,000 exclusion); see also § 2503(b) (2) (providing for
inflation adjustments); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707, 714 (2016) (reporting
.that the annual exclusion amount for 2017 was $14,000).
276. I.R.C. § 2522(a) (2).
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No charitable deduction is available, however, if a "donor transfers
an interest in property . .. to a [charity] ... and an interest in the same
property is retained by the donor, or is transferred .. . from the donor
to [another person other than a charity]."7 This is sometimes
referred to as the "partial interest rule" because it prohibits a
charitable deduction for the transfer of a partial interest to charity.7
Congress included some narrow exceptions with this all-or-nothing
rule that would not apply in a charitable naming transaction.'79
The regulations under the partial interest rule provide rules for
conditions precedent and conditions subsequent which could be
relevant for charitable naming transactions or other charitable
publicity arrangements. The regulations provide in part,
If an estate or interest has passed to, or is vested in, [a] charity on
the date of the gift and the estate or interest would be defeated by
the performance of some act or the happening of some event, the
possibility of occurrence of which appeared on such date to be so
remote as to be negligible, the deduction is allowable.280
If this exception does not apply, because the possibility is more than
negligible, the statutory partial interest rule will apply, the charitable
deduction will be unavailable, and the donor's gift to the charity could be
subject to the gift tax. This regulation might apply to a charitable naming
transaction if the donor contributed cash or property to the charity on
the condition that the charity name a prestigious building or other
space or place after the donor for a significant period of time or in
perpetuity.
Also, the federal estate tax regulations and the federal income tax
regulations employ the same test, namely "so remote as to be
negligible," in determining when a condition jeopardizes the
charitable deduction.8 Thus, if a donor's contribution is conditioned
277. § 2522(c) (2).
278. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(d) (1) (2016) (referring to a "contribution of a
partial interest in property").
279. See I.R.C. § 2522(c) (2) (A) (listing the major exceptions as a retained interest
in a charitable remainder annuity trust, a retained interest in a charitable remainder
unitrust, and an interest in a pooled income fund).
280. Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b) (1) (2016); see Briggs v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 646,
656-57 (1979) (defining the phrase "so remote as to be negligible" under the estate
tax regulations to mean "a chance which persons generally would disregard as so
highly improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a
serious business transaction").
281. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b)(1) (2016) (federal estate tax); § 1.170A-1(e)
(federal income tax).
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on the charity naming a building after the donor in perpetuity, and
there is a non-negligible risk the charity will remove the donor's name,
a portion of the contribution should be subject to gift tax (or estate tax
if the transfer is at death), and no charitable income tax deduction
should be allowed.' The Avery Fisher saga demonstrates that the risk
may be more than negligible when the following circumstances are
present: the donor and charity agree to perpetual naming rights, the
building will need renovation eventually, and the charity will be unable
to raise the necessary funds for a renovation without offering building
naming rights to a donor for the renovation. A researcher in 2007
determined that the traditional duration for charitable building
naming rights is perpetual.8
Nevertheless, no reported gift or estate tax rulings or cases appear
to even address the question.2 84 Thus, there seems to be no authority
that would suggest the IRS has even raised this issue. It appears that
practitioners do not contemplate any risk that a naming requirement
will be a more-than-negligible condition that may jeopardize the
income, gift, or estate tax charitable deduction.8
One estate tax case concluded that a deceased author's name can be
a property right subject to estate tax and the value depends on the
popularity of the name. In Estate of Andrews v. United States,"8 Virginia
C. Andrews died at the height of her fame.8 . Andrews was an
internationally-known, best-selling author, and the "undisputed
master" of the "children in jeopardy" genre. She had written seven
commercially-successful novels in the genre and was in the process of
282. See Gans et al., supra note 272, at 208 (emphasizing that the estate tax only
applies if there is a transfer of property).
283. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 162 ("The long-standing tradition is to use 'in
perpetuity' as the basis for the named gift."). But see id. at 143 (mentioning an example
where " [t]he name will remain on the building ... for the life of the building").
284. See supra note 272 (providing examples of cases and sources that fail to discuss
the issue).
285. See, e.g., Christine W. Hubbard, Draft Charitable Gifts that Protect Donor Intent and
Tax Savings, EST. PLAN., July 2015, at 26, 33 ("The IRS agrees that so long as these
[naming opportunity] gifts further the organization's charitable purposes, the
deductibility of a gift conditioned on the naming opportunity will be honored"). See
generally John McGown, Jr., Major Charitable Gifts-How Much Control Can Donors Keep
and Charities Give Up?, 91 J. TAx'N 279 (1999) (failing to discuss charitable naming
rights).
286. 850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994).




concluding a contract with her publisher in which she would produce
two more novels and receive $3 million in advance royalties.2 A
representative of her publisher stated, "[O]nly [fifty] other authors
ever had achieved the level of sales achieved by Andrews," and "[s] he
was one of those rare authors who brought millions of readers into the
stores within weeks of each new release.""0 Andrews died before the
publisher signed the $3 million contract.91  Nevertheless, the
publisher was confident that a ghostwriter could imitate the Virginia
C. Andrews style and successfully publish under her name.9  The
publisher entered into a contract with the Andrews estate allowing the
publisher to use the Andrews name.
Initially the Andrews estate included no value for her name on the
federal estate tax form." In response, the IRS asserted that the
"Andrews' name was an asset of the Estate" worth over $1.2 million."
At the trial, the estate argued that any value was speculative because
the ghostwriter might fail, and the name was worth only $140,000.'
Although there were concerns, the ghostwriter was very successful.
The publisher announced the ghostwriter's first book a commercial
success within a week of its release, and the ghostwriter produced at
least four more novels in the genre and in the Andrews style." All of
the ghostwriter's books published under the name "Virginia C.
Andrews" made no mention of the ghostwriter." The court indicated
that the name was a property right subject to the estate tax,' but the
court refused to assign a value beyond the first book because of the
uncertainty of success for any of the ghostwritten books at the date of
death.5" The IRS asserted a value of over $1.2 million, the estate
proposed $140,000, and the court determined a value of $703,000.o
289. Id. at 1281-82.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1283.
292. Id. (explaining that Andrew Niederman was the ghostwriter).
293. Id. at 1282-83.
294. Id. at 1281.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1288.
297. Id. at 1284; see also id. at 1286 (stating that all "five ghostwritten books ....
enjoyed great commercial success").
298. Id. at 1284.
299. Id. at 1288.
300. Id. at 1293.
301. Id. at 1295; see Madoff, supra note 272, at 780 (summarizing with what may have
been an intentional pun, Professor Madoff opined that the court's decision was an
"attempt to find a happy medium" (emphasis added)).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH INCONSISTENCY AND A PROPOSAL
Under the common law, many problems can arise if charitable
publicity transactions are treated as gifts rather than contracts. Gift
characterization may cause the parties to ignore matters they should
negotiate, trigger results that conflict with reasonable expectations,
and leave courts without appropriate options for resolving disputes.
Under the tax law, the current approach to charitable publicity is
inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court cases and places an undue
burden on other taxpayers. Because the facts and circumstances
involved in charitable publicity arrangements can differ, no single
approach may be perfect for all occasions, but treating significant
arrangements as part sales for both common law and tax purposes
generally would lead to more reasonable outcomes.
A. Problems with Inconsistent Positions
Problems arise when parties proceed as if the donor is making an
unrequited gift. In those situations, the parties likely anticipate the
donor will dictate the terms of the arrangement, the charity will
passively agree, and the parties will not negotiate the terms thoroughly
and carefully. One scholar devoted an entire law review article to
problems arising when the following set of facts exists: the charity fails
to negotiate a morals clause (also called a "bad boy" clause), the
naming donor's despicable conduct subsequently becomes public
knowledge, and the ensuing revelations tarnish the charity's
reputation.o Examples apparently abound, from the criminal
convictions of embezzler and former-Tyco C.E.O. Dennis Kozlowski
focusing unwanted attention on Seton Hall University,03 to the guilty
pleas of suspected child molester and former Illinois Congressman and
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Dennis Hastert
highlighting his connections with Wheaton College.34
302. See generally Eason, supra note 17 (discussing the negative effects of donative
naming).
303. See id. at 394-95 (noting that Kozlowski was charged with tax evasion, illegal
stock sales, and misappropriating corporate funds); see also Goldberg, supra note 26, at.
48-50 (discussing the effect of donor malfeasance and the importance of a morals
clause for charities).
304. See Katherine Skiba, Amid Allegations, Some Consider Removing Dennis Hastert's
Presence, CHI. TRIB. (June 13, 2015, 6:18 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-hastert-portrait-us-capitol-20150612-story.html (reporting that Wheaton
College removed Hastert's name from its Center for Economics, Government, and
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A different negotiation failure involves granting a major donor
perpetual publicity rights. The Avery Fisher saga in 1973" and the
David Geffen situation in 2015" both highlight a charity's difficulties
in negotiating a reasonable duration clause and the inevitable conflict
if the charity allows perpetual naming rights for a building that will
need costly renovation in the future. If the parties view the transaction
as a part-sale with the charity selling valuable publicity services, it may
set a tone allowing the charity to reasonably negotiate and protect its
interests. If the parties agree on reasonable endgame provisions
before the donor formally makes the substantial pledge, the results
may be more reasonable when the publicity needs to end, either
because of the donor's misdeeds or the need to renovate the building.
The Courts and Vanderbilt University cases, discussed above, indicate
other problems with gift treatment."' These cases demonstrate that,
if a court views the transaction as a gift, then the court may have little
flexibility in applying formation rules and in deciding upon a
remedy." Contract law doctrine allows a court to imply terms and
supply omitted terms, including morals clauses.' It also allows a court
to employ a range of remedies from benefit-of-the-bargain damages to
specific performance."'o In contrast, when a charity breaches its
Public Policy in connection with his indictment for banking irregularities stemming
from allegations of sex with minors).
305. See supra notes 1-4, 15-18 and accompanying text (describing the Avery Fisher
saga).
306. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (reporting that Lincoln Center
granted perpetual naming rights to David Geffen).
307. See supra notes 83-90, 68-81 (discussing the Courts and Vanderbilt University
cases respectively).
308. In contrast, the test for determining when a contract arises can depend on
whether a party reasonably believes a communication includes all of the expected
terms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining
an offer); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)
(indicating that whether a statement includes all the expected terms depends on the
other party's reasonable expectations).
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (providing that one reason
a court might supply an omitted term is because the parties had "expectations but
fail[ed] to manifest them").
310. See id. § 347 cmt. a (regarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages); id. § 364
(granting discretion to refuse specific performance "if such relief would be unfair");
see also Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1978) (demonstrating that under
contract law there is "liberality in the granting of an equitable remedy"). But see Prentis
Family Found., Inc. v. Karmanos Cancer Inst., 698 N.W.2d 900, 913 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (reporting that a trial court refused to base damages on the value of naming
rights because the donor was a charitable foundation rather than an individual, and
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publicity obligation as part of a conditional gift, the sole remedy is for
a court to order the return of the donation and payment of earnings
on that amount. The earnings are based on increases in the consumer
price index from the date of the contribution.1 As an example, in the
Vanderbilt University case, the court applied the conditional gift rules
rather than the contract rules. Thus, the court required Vanderbilt to
pay the Daughters of the Confederacy $1.2 million to remove the word
"Confederate"31 2 from the pediment of a building even though the
Daughters of the Confederacy paid only one-third of the initial cost of
the building, enjoyed the naming rights over the building for
approximately eighty years, and contributed nothing to a $2.5 million
renovation of the building.3 13
Several cases have characterized charitable naming arrangements as
conditional gifts,3"1 but there are also multiple cases treating these
arrangements as contracts.15 Thus, courts wishing to choose contract
characterization have authority to cite. Sometimes, it appears that
courts go out of their way to apply conditional gift law. For example,
in the Vanderbilt University case, after observing that the three written
documents between the donor and the university's predecessor
referred to the agreement as a "contract," the Tennessee Court of
Appeals declined to apply contract law."' The court stated that the
written agreements "do not purport to establish a typical commercial
arrangement in which one party provides certain goods or services in
return for a sum to be paid by the other party. "3 The court's
reasoning is unpersuasive because the Daughters of the Confederacy
this made the determination of damages impermissibly speculative; in any event, the
appellate court did not address the issue).
311. See Tenn. Div. of the Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174
S.W.3d 98, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (" [W] here a donee fails or ceases to comply with
the conditions of a gift, the donor's remedy is limited to recovery of the gift ... [and]
[t]o reflect the change in the buying power of the dollar, the amount [the charity]
must pay. . . should be based on the consumer price index. . . .").
312. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (reporting that Vanderbilt University
will pay $1.2 million to the Daughters of the Confederacy).
313. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Section I.B.
315. See supra Section IA.
316. Tenn. Div. of the Daughters of the Confederacy, 174 S.W.3d at 112.
317. Id. (emphasis added).
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paid a sum ($50,000) in return for services (perpetual publicity), and
many contracts are not commercial arrangements.
On the tax side, the Fisher family tale vividly demonstrates that the
IRS approach treating charitable publicity as worthless is contrary to
economic reality-the Fischer heirs sold the publicity rights for $15
million.3 " The IRS approach permits major donors purchasing
publicity to claim excessive income and gift tax deductions.' This
shifts more than sixty percent of the cost of naming donations to other
taxpayers.3 2 The IRS approach here is inconsistent with the approach
it has taken in similar situations. For example, under IRS Revenue
Ruling 67-246, if a charity arranges a fundraiser in which members pay
$100 to the charity in exchange for a $15 radio, the member is only
entitled to claim an $85 income tax deduction.2
B. Proposal for Reconciliation
As a preliminary matter, it is not expected that the federal income
tax system always will treat transactions consistently with other systems.
The tax system can have different objectives from another area of
inquiry, and as a result a different approach may be appropriate. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the federal income
tax rules should calculate "income" differently than generally accepted
accounting principles when the value of a corporation's inventory
drops in certain situations.23 Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for
318. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 259 (N.Y. 1891) (concluding an
arrangement was a contract when an uncle promised to pay his 16-year-old nephew
$5,000 in exchange for his nephew's promise to refrain from drinking alcohol,
smoking, swearing, playing cards for money, or playing billiards for money until
attaining age 21).
319. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 119-39 and accompanying text (discussing the income tax
deduction); supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (outlining the gift tax
deduction).
321. As an example, using the highest tax rates for 2017, if a donor contributes
$1 million in a charitable naming transaction and deducts $1 million, the after-
income-tax cost to the donor is $604,000 [$1 million x 39.6% = $396,000 in tax
savings]. If the donor had not made the contribution and the donor's estate was
subject to a 40% federal estate tax rate, the additional federal estate tax would have
been $241,600 ($604,000 x 40% = $241,600]. Thus, the combined income and estate
tax savings from the charitable gift was $637,600 [$396,000 + $241,600 = $637,600].
322. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 111 ex.11.
323. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1979) (observing that
although financial accounting is based on the principle of conservativism, the primary
goal of the income tax system is the "equitable collection of revenue," and "[g]iven
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both the common law and the tax system to treat significant charitable
publicity transactions as part sales.
In choosing whether to resolve the inconsistency by always treating
charitable publicity transactions as (i) unrequited gifts, or (ii) part
sales, common law cases exist to support either choice.32' Regardless,
under the common law, treating significant charitable publicity
arrangements as part sales (and therefore as contracts) rather than
gifts, should result in more predictable and reasonable results. As
discussed above, contractual (part sale) characterization may
encourage the parties to negotiate reasonable morals clauses and
duration clauses,2 ' allow courts to imply or add terms that the parties
failed to negotiate,26 and enable courts to craft appropriate remedies
for disputes the parties cannot resolve.
On the tax side, the IRS has been treating charitable publicity
transactions as unrequited gifts for almost five decades.32' The IRS can
change this approach, however, by embracing existing authorities-no
legislation is necessary. For federal income tax purposes, the IRS could
announce that, for significant charitable recognition transactions, it
will follow the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in American Bar
Endowment and Hernandez, and it will limit the application of Revenue
Ruling 68-432 to its particular facts. Revenue Ruling 68-432 did not
involve substantial naming or other publicity benefits; the only
this diversity ... any presumptive equivalency between tax and financial accounting
would be unacceptable"). In Thor Power Tool Co., the taxpayer and the IRS agreed the
fair market value of the taxpayer's spare parts inventory dropped. Id. at 526-27.
Although the drop-in values required the company to reduce its income for financial
accounting purposes under generally accepted accounting principles, the drop-in
value did not trigger an income tax deduction, and a corresponding decrease in
taxable income, because the evidence indicating the decline in value was not the type
of evidence listed in the IRS regulations supporting a deduction. See id. at 535-36.
324. Nevertheless, there may be situations when the transaction clearly is one or the
other. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (regarding the benevolent man
hypothetical and other factors in drawing the line between contracts and conditional
gifts). For example, it is unlikely that most reasonable persons would reap a benefit
from having an alcohol rehabilitation center named after them. See, e.g., Betty Ford
Center in Rancho Mirage, California, HAZELDEN BETIY FoRD FoUND.,
http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/locations/betty-ford-center-rancho-mirage (last
visited Aug. 30, 2017) (regarding the Betty Ford Alcoholism Center).
325. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 309.
327. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Section L.A (describing how the IRS established its approach to
charitable publicity transactions in the late 1960s and 1970s).
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publicity benefit the donating members received was the opportunity
to attend members-only events, including lectures.3' This negligible
benefit could be ignored under the insubstantial benefit exceptions
currently available according to the most recent iteration of Revenue
Procedures 90-12 and 92-58.sso
If it repealed the special rules, the IRS could allow the general rule
from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in American Bar Endowment o
apply. Under the American Bar Endowment approach, the donor would
have the burden to prove (i) the amount contributed in excess of the
fair market value of the return publicity benefit and (ii) that the donor
gave the excess with the intent to make a gift.3' Some might argue
that applying the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to charitable
publicity transactions will place an impossible valuation burden on
donors. In response, in Hernandez, the U.S. Supreme Court reduced
the donors' charitable tax deductions by the value of the church-
provided intangible religious benefits," even though there was no
commercial market for the benefits or any other easy way to value the
benefits."' In addition, in 2003, a Michigan trial court discussed the
fair market value of charitable naming rights for each of five different
types of donors.3
In Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Foundation, Inc. v. Barbara Ann
Karmanos Cancer Institute,"3 the court addressed whether the evidence
and arguments available to five different types of donors trying to value
naming rights would be too speculative to support an award of
damages for breach of a charitable publicity contract.3 '1 In 1985, the
329. Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104 (1968).
330. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 472 (1990); Rev. Proc. 92-58, 1992-2 C.B.
410, 410 (1992).
331. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1986).
332. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989) (explaining that the
donors received auditing and training services).
333. See id. at 706-07 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) ("It becomes impossible, however,
to compute the 'contribution' portion of a payment to a charity where what is received
in return is not merely an intangible, but an intangible ... that is not bought and sold
except in donative contexts so that the only 'market' price against which it can be
evaluated is a market price that always includes donations.").
334. Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Found., Inc. v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer
Inst., No. 00-024848 CK, 2003 WL 25756356, at *1-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct.June 4, 2003), affd
in part, rev'd in part 698 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. App. 2005).
335. No. 00-024848 CK, 2003 WL 25756356 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 4, 2003), affd in
part, rev'd in part 698 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. App. 2005).
336. See id. at *1-2.
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Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Foundation pledged $1.5 million over
a five-year period to establish an endowment to benefit a cancer center
affiliated with Wayne State University.3 7 The court characterized the
arrangement as a contract33" and stated that "as consideration for the
1.5 million dollar contribution to the cancer center," the
Comprehensive Care Center of Metropolitan Detroit would be
"renamed and henceforth known as" the Meyer L. Prentis
Comprehensive Cancer Center of Metropolitan Detroit.39 All parties
agreed that the cancer center operated under the Meyer L. Prentis
name consistently and exclusively for nine years although the entity
never formally changed its corporate name.o The Prentis Family
Foundation argued that the cancer center breached the naming
obligation after it merged in 1994 with the Michigan Cancer
Foundation, accepted a $15 million donation from Peter Karmanos,
and adopted the name "Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute."4
The court emphasized that the new donor, Mr. Peter Karmanos,
owned Compuware, a commercial enterprise. The lower court
concluded that the charity breached its naming obligation, and the
Meyer L. Prentis Foundation could require the entity to readopt the
Meyer L. Prentis name as a specific performance remedy.343 The court
went on to consider whether the Meyer L. Prentis Foundation could choose
to recover money damages as an alternative remedy and allow the
cancer center to continue using the Barbara Ann Karmanos name.4
The Michigan court indicated whether money damages would be
available for breach of a charitable publicity arrangement for five
different types of donors, or whether, in each situation, the calculation
of money damages would be too speculative and therefore not
337. Id.
338. See Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Found., Inc., No. 00-024848 CK., 2001 WL
36154245, at *2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 16, 2001) (concluding that the six-year statute of
limitations for a breach of contract action would apply to an allegation that the charity
failed to honor its publicity obligations), affd in part, rev'd in part, 698 N.W.2d 900
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
339. Id. at *6.
340. Id. at *2.
341. See Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Found., Inc. No. 00-024848 CK, 2003 WL
25756356, at *2.
342. Id. at *8.
343. Id. at *2-3 ("Judge Svenson found the Defendant breached the 1985
Agreement and granted equitable relief.").
344. Id. at *4-8.
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available under common law." First, the court discussed situations
when a commercial entity donates and "there is clearly a valuable
commercial purpose" and indicated that the commercial entity could
recover money damages for its commercial loss." Second, the court
speculated that Peter Karmanos, the owner of Compuware, could
recover money damages if the entity breached its naming obligation to
him, to the extent of his commercial loss.4 7  This may be highly
relevant in other situations because many other naming donors likely
are closely affiliated to commercial enterprises. Third, the court
implied that if a charity made a donation to another charity, and the
donor charity could prove that it would be unable to raise funds "as a
result of losing its naming rights" it would be able to recover money
damages.' Fourth, the court implied that an individual naming
donor could recover money damages for "hurt feelings" if the charity
breached the naming obligation. Fifth, the court concluded that a
family'charitable foundation that cannot prove it will be unable to raise
funds will not be able to recover money damages for a breach of a
naming obligation because it cannot prove a monetary loss and will not
suffer "hurt feelings.""o In this fifth scenario, the court noted that a
founder or substantial contributor of the family charitable foundation
may experience "hurt feelings," but the loss would not be compensable
because it would be the charitable family foundation and not the
individual founder or substantial contributor, who would be the
345. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. IAw INST. 1981)
("Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits
to be established with reasonable certainty."); see, e.g., Chi. Coliseum Club v. Dempsey,
265 Ill. App. 542, 550 (1932) ("Compensation for damages for breach of contract must
be established by evidence from which a court or jury are able to ascertain the extent
of such damages ... to a reasonable degree of certainty.").
346. Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Found., Inc., No. 00-024848 CK, 2003 WL
25756356, at *7; see, e.g.,Jody Meacham, Avaya Says It Will Keep Its Name on Soccer Stadium
While It Reorganizes, SILICON VALLEY Bus. J. (Jan. 20, 2017, 1:52 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2017/01/20/avaya-says-it-will-keep-its-
name-on-soccer-stadium.html (reporting that Santa Clara tech company Avaya
planned to keep its brand name on the home of the San Jose Earthquake soccer team
despite filing bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and that Avaya purchased the naming
rights for ten years in exchanged for $20 million in 2014).
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plaintiff in the case suing to enforce the naming rights.' The court
indicated the result may have been different if the original 1985
agreement allocated a portion of the contribution to the acquisition of
the naming rights.352
The Prentis Family Foundation case identifies two types of value,
commercial and emotional, that a donor could try to value. Donors
would need to monetize the commercial and emotional value under
the American Bar Endowment test to claim a charitable income tax
deduction. The standard definition of "fair market value" for tax
purposes is "the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts,"'3 and there appears to be no reason to deviate from
the standard definition in these situations.' In the first two categories
identified in Prentis-a commercial entity donating or an individual
with a commercial interest donating-the amount commercial entities
pay to name commercial facilities, such as professional sports stadiums,
could be relevant. Researchers indicate that schools or other charities
typically require that the naming donor for a building contribute fifty
percent of the cost of the building, and in a noncharitable situation, a
professional sports team typically requires a commercial firm to pay
ten percent to twenty percent of the building cost to name a
professional sports stadium.' Thus, using these rules of thumb,
perhaps twenty percent to forty percent of a commercially motivated
naming philanthropist's contribution represents the purchase price of
the publicity, and the balance is an unrequited gift.3" Commercial
351. Id.
352. Id. at *7.
353. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c) (2) (2016).
354. See, e.g., Turner v. Comm'r, 13 T.C.M. 462 (1954) (considering the subjective
value of a prize to the taxpayer, but involving unique facts, specifically a luxury item
the.taxpayer did not choose which was subject to the control of a third party).
355. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 142-43; William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and
Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 93-96 (2011) (listing
nineteen sports stadium naming rights deals from 1994 to 2004); see also Cory
Weinberg, Not Everybody Is Happy with Company Names on Business School Buildings,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2014, 10:59 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-23/business-schools-cause-
scrutiny-for-naming-buildings-after-corporations (reporting that naming gifts typically
must cover at least fifty percent of the fundraising amount).
356. As an example, if a charitable building cost $100 million, the charity would
require the naming donor to contribute $50 million. Also, in the case of a professional
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entities generally consider the extent and quality of brand exposure
when deciding to purchase or contribute.
In the case of a naming individual without a commercial interest,
the Prentis case suggests that the return benefit would be the emotional
value from the publicity, perhaps bearing some inverse relation to the
"hurt feelings" when the charity breaches the deal and removes the
donor's name. Many authors throughout the ages have discussed the
noneconomic benefits of naming, including glory, prestige, and
improved social reputation for generosity, wealth, and power."
Although courts have monetized subjective values to calculate damages
in the case of family heirlooms, haunted houses, and collectibles or
nostalgic items,"' perhaps the appraisal for tax purposes should be
sports stadium that costs $100 million, a commercial firm might purchase the naming
rights for only $10 or $20 million. These figures suggest he naming charitable donor
spent $10 or $20 million for the naming rights, and the excess of $30 or $40 million
was a charitable gift. Some may argue the charitable naming rights provide a
fundamentally different benefit that should not be equated with the brand name
recognition the commercial firm is buying with naming the sports stadium.
Nevertheless, the analogy may become more appropriate as more commercial firms
purchase charitable naming rights. See Weinberg, supra note 355 (quoting the
president of the Council for Advancement and Support of Education, who stated that
"[t]he practice of putting corporate names on campus buildings goes back at least
three decades but is accelerating").
357. See William A. Drennan, Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of College Athletics: A
Balanced Proposa4 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1353, 1380 (2012) (discussing brand exposure in
relation to college athletic sponsorships).
358. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 11 n.29
(1992) (quoting ADAM SMrrIH, AN INQUiRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 79 (Edwin Canna ed., University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776)) ("[T]he
chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never
so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which
nobody can possess but themselves."); Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the
Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 567, 575-76 (1997) (asserting that
charitable publicity signals wealth, power, and generosity, all prized and envied traits);
see also Konigsberg & Howe, supra note 23 (quoting Mark Twain regarding his
assessment that steel magnate Andrew Carnegie's endowment of 3500 libraries was "a
shrewd plan not to elevate mankind but to secure [Carnegie's] immortality.. . . He
has bought fame and paid cash for it .... He has arranged that his name shall be
famous in the mouths of men for centuries to come"); McAdams, supra, at 3 ("[A]n
important and often-neglected aspect of human motivation ... is that . .. actors seek
not an absolute end, but relative position among peers .... Whether it is termed
'status,' 'prestige,' or 'distinction,' people sometimes seek-as an end in itself-relative
position....").
359. See Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 267 (1983) (calculating the change in
the fair market value of a home because it was the site of five murders). "Stamp
collections and gold speculation would be insane activities if utilitarian considerations
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more objective. In Revenue Ruling 67-246, the IRS refused to consider
the donor's subjective wishes when the donor received a return
benefit, and instead, the IRS embraced an objective approach.' For
example, if a charity announces it will award a concert ticket to every
person donating at least $100, and the concert ticket would sell on the
open market for $5, a person donating $100 could only deduct $95
even if the donor has absolutely no wish to receive the concert ticket
or attend the concert.61 Consistent with this objective approach, the
IRS might prefer to value all publicity rights based on their commercial
value if purchased by a business enterprise.
Since 2001, when the Michigan trial court issued its order in the
Prentis case, commercial firms have become more active in purchasing
naming rights for charitable buildings, arguably establishing a
market.36 2 Many corporations have purchased the naming rights for
university business schools or centers.6 For example, Capitol Federal
Savings Bank donated $20 million, and in exchange the University of
Kansas named its business school Capitol Federal Hall. 3' The CEO of
Capitol Federal was clear about motives when saying he "hopes the
name will encourage university faculty, students, and their parents to
do business with the bank."" Other examples include Wells Fargo
Hall at U.C. San Diego's Rady School of Management, the Office
Depot Center at Florida Atlantic's College of Business, and PACCAR
Hall (named after the truck-maker) at the University of Washington's
Foster School of Business.36
CONCLUSION
Society is divided about donor recognition. Historically, anonymous
giving was the norm, some rather humble donor recognition was not
were the sole measure of value." Id.; see also W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Measure of
Damages for Conversion or Loss of or Damage to, Personal Property Having No Market Value,
12 A.L.R.2d 902 (1950).
360. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104,105 (1967).
361. Id.








unheard of,67 and conspicuous philanthropy was the exception.3 ' In
the late 1960s and the 1970s, it is not surprising that the IRS effectively
ignored public recognition and treated these transactions as
unrequited gifts because charities seldom provided significant
publicity. Times changed. Charitable recognition exploded in the
1990s."9 Commentators now observe that charities routinely
emblazon donor names across all charitable properties as enduring
testimonials.7 o
Some commentators indicate that conspicuous philanthropy is less
virtuous than anonymous giving.371 They emphasize motives such as
those expressed by the naming philanthropist for the student athletic
complex at the University of Chicago, who said the athletic complex
was like his tombstone, advertising to all the world that he "worked
hard . .. accumulated money and. . . left something behind."37 2
Others, however, praise conspicuous philanthropy because recent
social science research shows public recognition increases giving ' and
assert that a charity failing to provide publicity to substantial donors
jeopardizes its charitable mission.74
For common law purposes, an intermediate position, treating
significant conspicuous philanthropy under existing authorities as part
sales, and therefore as contracts, will encourage more effective arm's
length negotiations between naming donors and the charities, thereby
367. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 104 (1968) (describing an
arrangement in which donating members could attend members-only lectures at a
library and museum).
368. See Drennan, supra note 355, at 51 n.31 (listing a few historical examples of
conspicuous philanthropy).
369. BURTON, supra note 4, at 49 (referring to a "groundswell of naming rights
activities").
370. See Charles Isherwood, The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/theater/02ishe.html ("Whatever
happened to Anonymous? ... [Wihat became of those wealthy philanthropists who
used to support ... charitable institutions without requiring that their names be
slapped somewhere-anywhere, it sometimes seems-on a building.").
371. See, e.g., Patricia M. Jones, Gift Has Name for It, CHr. TRIB. (Jan. 10, 1999),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-01-10/news/9901100326; see also BURTON,
supra note 4, at xvi (referring to the "moral high road").
372. Jones, supra note 371.
373. See Brian Broughman & Robert Cooter, 'Charity and Infornation: Correcting the
Failure of a Disjunctive Social Norm, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 885 n.49 (2010)
(" [P]ublicity [sharply] increases charitable giving in [the] aggregate.").
374. BURTON, supra note 4, at xvii.
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reducing disputes. In addition, a contract approach will allow courts
more flexibility in fashioning remedies when disputes arise.
For tax purposes, the extreme position of treating charitable
publicity transactions as unrequited gifts regardless of the facts ignores
economic reality and allows donors excessive tax deductions. As the
old adages say, "If you want more of something, subsidize it; if you want
less, tax it," 3 7' and "Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy."3 7 6 The
IRS can adopt a more balanced approach, treating these transactions
as part sale and part gift, by following two U.S. Supreme Court cases
on charitable giving that reduce the donor's charitable tax deduction
by the value of the return benefit the charity provides to the donor.
The tax approach may be fueling the edifice complex. Professor
Fleisher asserts that the "edifice complex occurs when the pleasure or
prestige from giving encourages donors to fund projects that are
already funded close to optimal levels. Due to prestige that
accompanies naming a building, this often results in over-building on
campus."77  Professor Fleischer also observes that, because of the
edifice complex, "bequests to large, wealthy organizations such as
colleges or museums fund more capital projects (such as buildings)
than are actually needed."7 Presumably, the edifice complex makes
it more difficult for charities to raise funds for routine operations.
Recently, a homeless shelter gerrymandered a naming benefit to
encourage donors to contribute routine supplies.7' This Article's tax
proposal would not necessarily bring back anonymous giving, but it
would eliminate artificial tax incentives for conspicuous philanthropy.
375. Jeffrey L.Yablon, As Certain asDeath--Quotations about Taxes (2006Edition), 110
TAX NoTEs 103, 108 (2006) (referring to an "Old Economic Adage").
376. Id. at 139 (quoting WilliamJ. BrennanJr.).
377. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX
L. REV. 263, 302 n.156 (2007); see also Gergen, supra note 12, at 1409; Sarah E. Waldeck,
The Coming Showdown over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 1795, 1819 (2009) ("[U]niversities might respond by encouraging the kind of
gifts that contribute to the edifice complex, that is, the construction of new buildings
or general campus beautification.").
378. Fleischer, supra note 377, at 302.
379. Sarah Murray, Institutional Naming Rights Gaining Favour Among Wealthy Donors,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/5c1d62e0-3834-11e4-a687-
00144feabdcO?mhq5j=e2 (reporting that Urban Ministries of Durham, North Carolina
adopted the "'Names for Change campaign"' in which visitors to its website can choose
from more than 160 items, including tampons or foodstuffs, and "for their donation
they get a certificate with an image of the object and their name").
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